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Abstract
Behavioral studies have shown that humans account for uncertainty in a way that is
nearly optimal in the Bayesian sense. Probabilistic models based on Bayes’ theorem have
been widely used for understanding human cognition, and have been applied to behaviors
that range from perception and motor control to higher level reasoning and inference.
However, whether the brain actually uses Bayesian reasoning or such reasoning is just an
approximate description of human behavior is an open question. In this thesis, I aim to
address this question by exploring the neural plausibility of Bayesian inference.
I first present a spiking neural model for learning priors (beliefs) from experiences of
the natural world. Through this model, I address the question of how humans might be
learning the priors needed for the inferences they make in their daily lives. I propose neural
mechanisms for continuous learning and updating of priors - cognitive processes that are
critical for many aspects of higher-level cognition. Next, I propose neural mechanisms for
performing Bayesian inference by combining the learned prior with the likelihood that is
based on the observed information. Through the process of building these models, I address
the issue of representing probability distributions in neural populations by deploying an
efficient neural coding scheme. I show how these representations can be used in meaningful
ways to learn beliefs (priors) over time and to perform inference using those beliefs.
The final model is generalizable to various psychological tasks, and I show that it con-
verges to the near optimal priors with very few training examples. The model is validated
using a life span inference task, and the results from the model match human performance
on this task better than an ideal Bayesian model due to the use of neuron tuning curves.
This provides an initial step towards better understanding how Bayesian computations may
be implemented in a biologically plausible neural network. Finally, I discuss the limitations
iii
and suggest future work on both theoretical and experimental fronts.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Human beings are able to understand and make sense of the information we perceive on
a daily basis. But, how do we make sense of all the information we perceive? When we
look at an object, how are we able to deduce all its attributes like color, shape etc.? One
possible hypothesis is that we are able to do these things due to the knowledge bank which
we have acquired from our prior experiences. For example, we are able to infer the sense of
a word having different meanings based on the context it is being used in. This is because
the context provides additional information that helps us pick the correct meaning of the
word from our knowledge bank. However, what if the given word does not exist in our
knowledge bank (i.e., we have never seen that word before)? In this case, we are still able
to guess what the meaning of the word might be, based on the contextual information
provided. This indicates that the human brain is not only able to recall what it had
learned before, but also use that information to make inferences. We make such inferences
on a daily basis e.g., trying to reason out the best move in a game of chess, inferring the
personality of people we meet based on a short interaction with them, inferring the speed
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of an approaching car when crossing a road etc.
In most of these cases, external stimuli interact with internal factors such as our emo-
tions or memories to influence how we act. However, when the brain perceives the physical
world to make a decision or to take an action, it needs to deal with the uncertainty as-
sociated with the sensory system as well as its own knowledge. Moreover, computations
performed by the nervous system are also subject to uncertainty because of the influence
of cellular and synaptic noise. Thus, at the level of cognition, the models that the brain
uses to interact with its environment must necessarily cope with missing and imperfect
information about the world. This suggests that being able to account for probabilistic
contingencies in the environment and stochasticity within our own nervous system can be
useful for cognitive functions like perception, decision making, thinking, planning, etc.
The Bayesian framework provides a coherent way of dealing with these uncertainties.
Bayesian methods are based on the Bayes’ theorem, which states that one’s belief about
the world should be updated according to the product of what one believed before and
what evidence has been observed since. It offers a mathematically rigorous approach to
combine the prior knowledge with the incoming evidence. The term “belief” is commonly
used to describe one’s knowledge of probabilistic information about variables that either
describe the state of the world or describe a mental state. It can be considered as one’s
subjective probability implying that a person with a stronger belief in a given proposition
has a higher subjective probability (Ma and Jazayeri, 2014). Additionally, uncertainty is
usually specified in terms of the width of the belief distribution. For example, when trying
to gauge the speed of an approaching taxi, one could maintain a belief distribution over the
taxi speed. In this case, the sensory uncertainty can be defined as the standard deviation
of the belief distribution over the taxi speed (e.g., 60 ± 5 km/h). In case of fog or at night
time, the uncertainty may be higher (e.g., 60 ± 15 km/h). While some beliefs may be
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innate, others could be acquired through life experience, or some may be a combination of
both.
Behavioral studies have confirmed that humans often account for uncertainty in a way
that is nearly optimal in the Bayesian sense (i.e., “Bayes optimal”) (Ma et al., 2006). This
implies that (1) neural circuits must, at least implicitly, represent probability distributions,
and (2) neural circuits must be able to effectively compute with these probability distribu-
tions in order to perform Bayesian inference near-optimally. Probabilistic models based on
Bayes’ rule have been widely used for understanding human cognition including inference,
parameter and structure learning (Jacobs and Kruschke, 2011), and word learning (Xu and
Tenenbaum, 2007).
However, most Bayesian models lack biological plausibility because it is unclear how
these computations might be realized in the brain. In particular, many of these models
rely on sophisticated computations, including high-dimensional integration, precise multi-
plication, and large-scale structure representation. But, few demonstrate how such com-
putations could be performed with spiking neurons. This is one of the questions I address
in this thesis: How can we represent probability distributions in spiking neural circuits,
and how can we use these representations in meaningful ways to perform inference.
A biologically plausible Bayesian approach can provide us insights into the working of
the brain at multiple levels of analysis (Eliasmith, 2013). Moreover, it can also help in
making more accurate normative predictions about how the perceptual system combines
prior knowledge with sensory observations, enabling more accurate interpretations of data
from psychological experiments (Doya, 2007). And finally, it can point the way towards
approximate Bayesian algorithms that are efficiently implemented in a neural substrate.
Griffiths et al. (2012) conclude that different theoretical frameworks, such as Bayesian
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modeling and connectionism, have different insights to offer about human cognition, dis-
tributed across different levels of analysis. In this thesis, I make an initial attempt towards
integrating these levels. I explore the neural basis of Bayesian inference to answer questions
about how beliefs (prior distributions) can be learned through life experience, how these
distributions can be represented in a connectionist framework using spiking neurons, and
how the neural representations of these distributions can be used in meaningful ways to
reproduce human behavior.
1.1 Thesis Organization
In chapter 2, background, I provide an overview of the Bayes’ theorem and set the
context that it is used in within this thesis (i.e., cognitive modeling rather than data
analysis and psychometric models). Given the focus on cognitive modeling, I describe
different levels of analysis that the brain can be modeled/studied at, and provide motivation
for bridging these levels in the context of Bayesian models of cognition. I end it with a
review of different neural coding schemes for probability distributions.
In chapter 3, computational neuroscience, I describe the theoretical framework
used to build the neural models presented in this thesis. Specifically, I present the Neural
Engineering Framework (NEF) that describes how information can be represented in neural
populations, how these representations can be transformed within neural networks and
how their interactions can lead to dynamics in neural systems. Additionally, I also explain
how the NEF can be used for neural coding of probability distributions using an explicit
probability code. These methods are necessary to understand the models presented in
subsequent chapters.
In chapter 4, a spiking neural model for learning priors, I detail the procedure
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used to build a neural model spanning the levels of analysis presented in chapter 2. I ask
the question: “How does the human brain learn the priors (beliefs) it uses for making daily
life inferences?”; and propose a neural model to answer that question. The model is built
based on the methods explained in chapter 3. The assumptions underlying the model are
stated, its architecture is explained and the results showing the successful convergence of
the model to the near optimal priors are presented.
In chapter 5, a spiking neural model for Bayesian inference, I extend the model
presented in chapter 4 to include the neural circuitry for performing Bayesian inference. I
illustrate (using the life span inference task) that the priors learned by the neural model
can be successfully used to perform Bayesian inference in a neurally plausible way. The
predictions made by the neural model are compared to human predictions on the life span
inference task and results showing a close match are presented.
In chapter 6, discussion and conclusions, I address some of the unaddressed top-
ics regarding the neural model presented in chapter 5 and propose directions for future
research. Finally, I conclude the thesis by revisiting the goals listed in the next section.
1.2 Thesis Goals
The purpose of this thesis is to propose low-level neural realizations for the high-level
Bayesian computations commonly used in models of cognitive inference. These models
generally use a combination of a prior (previous knowledge) and a likelihood (derived from
new observations) to make inferences in a given task. Proposing neural realizations for such
computations is quite challenging since it involves answering several questions, including:
How do humans acquire the knowledge that they use for making daily life inferences? How
much of this knowledge is innate and how much is learned? How does the brain learn it
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from experiences of the natural world?. Given how and what prior knowledge is acquired,
additional questions are raised, such as: How is this knowledge represented in our brain?
How is it used for performing inferences in our daily lives? How are the computations to
do so realized in the brain?.
A complete story answering all of these questions would be overly ambitious, so I make
following the goals of this thesis:
• To illustrate a systematic approach for integrating the different levels of analysis i.e.,
from high-level abstract computations to low-level neural mechanisms through the
process of building a neurally plausible Bayesian model;
• To propose neural mechanisms that may be used for learning priors from experiences
of the natural world, based on clearly defined assumptions;
• To show how these priors (and any probability distribution in general) can be repre-
sented in neural circuits using an efficient neural coding scheme;
• To propose neural mechanisms for combining neural representations of learned priors
with those of new observations (i.e, likelihood) to perform Bayesian inference; and
• To reproduce human behavioral results for an inference task (the life span infer-
ence task) using the neurally plausible Bayesian model of cognitive inference that is
proposed in this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
Bayes’ theorem lies at the heart of the Bayesian inference. It was first proposed by a
mathematician Thomas Bayes in the 18th century. The theorem provides a way to revise
existing beliefs or predictions given new additional evidence which has not been observed
before. Bayes’ theorem has widespread applications ranging from financial analysis (e.g.,
for predicting stock prices), to medical diagnosis (e.g., to determine the accuracy of a
medical test), to spam filtering, and any application where predictions need to be made by
combining previous knowledge about a variable quantity with new information. Though the
Bayesian framework has been expanded to include other methods for approximate inference
e.g., variational Bayesian methods, Monte Carlo sampling methods, etc., understanding of
such methods is out of scope.
In this chapter, I start by providing a review of the Bayes’ theorem and explain the
different contexts that it is most commonly used in. I draw distinctions between the three
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kinds of Bayesian models: cognitive, data analysis and psychometric, and clarify that it
will be used in the cognitive modeling context in this thesis. This is followed by a review
of the different levels of analysis at which Bayesian models of cognition can be built to
study the brain. The interdependence of these levels is emphasized, and a recent extension
of the levels is described. Motivation for bridging these levels of analysis specifically for
Bayesian models of cognition is provided through a discussion of the significance of Bayesian
cognitive models. As an initial step in this direction, different theoretical schemes for
encoding probability distributions in neurons and neural populations are reviewed.
2.2 Bayes’ Theorem
Bayes’ theorem is an elementary result of probability theory that Bayesian inference grew
out of. Given two random variables, H and D, probability theory can be used to write the
joint probability, p(H,D), of these two variables as follows:
p(H,D) = p(H|D)p(D) = p(D|H)p(H) (2.1)
This implies:
p(H|D) = p(D|H)p(H)/p(D) (2.2)
The above expression provides a method to compute the conditional probability of H
given D from the conditional probability of D given H and is known as Bayes’ theorem.
If we assume that D represents some observed data, then Bayes’ theorem can be used to
infer the process responsible for generating that data. Let H represent the set of hypothe-
ses about this process, and let p(H) indicate one’s degree of belief in those hypotheses, i.e.,
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the probability that a given H is the true generating process (also known as the prior prob-
ability). Bayes’ theorem provides a way to update one’s beliefs about various hypotheses in
the light of the evidence provided by the data D, by computing the posterior probability,
P (H|D), i.e., the degree of belief in the hypothesis H conditioned on the observed data D
(given by equation 2.2).
Bayes’s theorem and related methods have been used to study the brain by building
Bayesian models in mainly three alternative contexts:
1. Data Analysis: Bayesian data analysis methods (Friedman et al. 2000: part 5, Kr-
uschke 2014) have been widely used in analyzing experimental data in various fields
including neuroscience. In this case, the associated Bayesian model and its param-
eters describe the trends in the data obtained empirically, e.g, neuro-imaging data,
expression data for thousands of genes, etc. (Stephan et al. 2009, Trujillo-Barreto
et al. 2004, Penny et al. 2011). However, the model parameters do not refer to
anything in the process that generated the data.
Models that fall into this category usually contain a prior on some parameters, and
use the experimental data to generate a posterior (on these parameters) that explains
the experimental data. These models do not make any claims about the perceptual,
cognitive or neural processes that may have lead to the data being analyzed.
2. Psychometric Models: Bayesian models whose parameters describe trends in behav-
ioral data fall into this category (Levy and Mislevy 2016, Kuss et al. 2005). Though
the parameters in these models refer to mental constructs, the models provide a
computational level explanation, and there doesn’t need to be a Bayesian process
that generated the data. Models in this category are similar to the data analysis
models, except for the fact that the data is generated by the “mind” of the subjects
9
involved in the behavioral study. These models provide explanations of behavioral
data without making any claim about the Bayesian processes occurring in the brain
of the subjects.
3. Cognitive Models: These are the models that aim at explaining human cognitive
processes like reasoning, perceptual inference, causal learning, language processing,
etc.(Griffiths et al. 2008, Chater et al. 2010). These models are of the view that the
Bayesian processes occur within the brain of the subject. The parameters of these
models describe mental representations, and the Bayesian inference is done by the
“mind” that given some observed data about the world, tries to draw conclusions
about its underlying structure, and then uses this knowledge to make inferences
about new cases.
The knowledge is represented in the form of a prior on parameters and the observed
data is usually the sensory data perceived by a subject. These models use the prior
and the sensory data to generate a posterior on parameters, that explains the sensory
data. All components of the model are thought to exist within the subject’s brain,
except the sensory data, which comes from the outside world.
While all of the above models are important applications of Bayes’ theorem, in this
thesis, I focus on using Bayes’ theorem for building Cognitive Models.
In cognitive modeling, Bayes’ theorem provides a method to combine the sensory in-
formation with one’s prior beliefs in an optimal way. Bayesian inference about a variable
Z e.g., the speed on an approaching taxi, based on sensory information X is performed
by computing the posterior probability p(Z|X), which specifies what is known about the
variable Z after the sensory information has been perceived. Bayes’ theorem states that
the posterior probability can be computed as follows:
10
p(Z|X) = p(X|Z) p(Z) / p(X) (2.3)
Here p(Z) is the prior that describes the probability distribution of Z before the per-
ception of any sensory information. In other words, it captures one’s prior beliefs about
the variable Z. The probability p(X|Z) is a function of Z and is commonly called the
likelihood function. It describes how the sensory information depends on the variable Z.
The posterior probability p(X|Z) quantifies how much one should believe a particular
Z, given the sensory information observed. The probability p(X) is the sum of probabilities
of the sensory information arising under all possible values of Z, and is given by p(X) =∑
i p(Zi) p(X|Zi). Thus, the posterior probability p(Zi|X), of a particular value Zi of
variable Z, is the ratio of the probability of the sensory evidence under Zi (the product
of its prior and likelihood: p(X|Zi) p(Zi) ) relative to the total probability of the sensory
evidence arising under all possible values of the variable Z (the sum of the prior-likelihood
products for all possible values of Z i.e., p(X)).
2.3 Levels of Analysis
Bayesian framework can be used to build models of cognition at different levels of analysis as
originally proposed by David Marr (Marr, 1982) and extended by Tomaso Poggio (Poggio,
2012). Marr proposed that complex information processing systems like the brain be should
be studied at different levels as given below:
• Computational level: At the computational level, the Bayesian framework can be
used to specify the nature of the problems that the brain faces, i.e., what are the
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goals, what computations might be appropriate to achieve these goals, what is the
structure of the environment these goals should be achieved in, and what is the logic
of the strategy to achieve them.
• Algorithmic level: This forms a bridge between computational and implementation
levels, and answers questions on how the computational theory proposed at the com-
putational level is implemented, i.e., how are the inputs and outputs represented,
what computational operations can be employed over those representations, what
algorithms are used for the necessary transformations, etc. Work done at the com-
putational level might tell us that the brain faces probabilistic challenges, however
our brain might solve them using some approximations, e.g., to save resources. Such
computations may also be subject to the brain’s representational and architectural
constraints.
• Implementation level: This level states how the representations and algorithms pro-
posed at the algorithmic level can be realized in the physical substrate, e.g., biolog-
ically in the brain through the wetware, cells and circuits. It involves mapping the
algorithmic Bayesian formalism to neuronal processes. For example, it is possible
that that individual neurons or populations of neurons may directly encode probabil-
ity distributions, and that some neural processes might be carrying out probabilistic
inference (Ma et al. 2006, Narain et al. 2018).
Though some people might be of the view that explanations at different levels above
are largely independent of each other (e.g., a software engineer doesn’t need to know the
computer hardware in detail), Poggio (2012) has argued that these levels are highly in-
terdependent since the knowledge at the implementation level provides constraints for the
algorithmic level, and contributes to the characterization of the problem at the compu-
12
tational level. Additionally, insights gained at the computational and algorithmic levels
help in asking the right questions and performing the right kind of experiments at the
implementation level. Besides emphasizing the connections between these levels, Poggio
has also extended the range of levels to include evolution and learning. In his own words:
“not only we need to know how transistors and synapses work, which algorithms are used
for computations such as stereo, and what are the goals and the constraints of computa-
tions such as object recognition, but we also need to understand how a child may learn
recognition and how evolution could have discovered the learning algorithms themselves.
In short, in addition to the old, classical levels, we also need to understand what is the role
of nature and nurture in the development of intelligence”.
The two new levels added by Poggio are described below:
• Learning: Poggio has proposed that the level of learning should be added to the list
of levels of understanding above the computational level. This level asks questions
including: How are the representations in the brain learned? How do humans learn
from experiences of natural world? How do humans learn from very few examples?
What are the learning algorithms employed by humans and What are their a priori
assumptions?
• Evolution: This level was added above the learning level and suggests that the effec-
tiveness with which humans learn and perform in the world is partly due to the huge
bank of prior knowledge. Questions asked at this level are: How do the computations
in the brain evolve with evolution? How is evolution responsible for intelligence?
What is the path taken by evolution to develop intelligence? How does learning
evolve by itself in a given species?
Note that the two levels added by Poggio do not seem to be the same kinds of levels as
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proposed by Marr, i.e., they are not abstractions. For instance, we can think of learning as
having a computational, algorithmic and implementation level 1. However, through these
two levels, Poggio underscores the importance of understanding how an organism (or a
species as a whole) is able to learn and evolve the computations and representations that
allow it to survive in the natural world.
2.4 Bridging levels for Bayesian models of cognition
Many behavioral studies and psychophysical experiments suggest that the human brain
represents and manipulates uncertain information in terms of probability distributions in
some way. As a result, probabilistic models based on Bayes’ rule have been widely used
to answer questions about how the brain makes generalizations and predictions about the
world, using the noisy and incomplete information available to it. Some of the domains
to which this framework has been applied include language learning (Xu and Tenenbaum
2007, Goldwater and Griffiths 2007, Teh 2006, Griffiths and Kalish 2005), motor control
(Wolpert and Landy, 2012), visual perception (Mamassian et al. 2002, ), inductive inference
(Tenenbaum et al. 2006, Brody and Lapata 2009), and causal learning (Gopnik et al. 2004,
Waldmann and Martignon 1998, Lu et al. 2008).
However, most of these models are built at the computational level, i.e., they provide an
ideal solution to an abstract statistical problem that people must solve, without identifying
the cognitive or neural processes involved in representing and transforming information,
1Keith Nishihara expressed using a diagram presented in the appendix of Poggio (2012), that it may
be more useful to think of learning as having a computational, algorithmic and implementation level.
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and without addressing the question of how such processes might be realized in the brain.
In order to fully assess the implications of the Bayesian framework for improving our
understanding of cognition and the brain, it is important for it to bridge the different
levels of analysis discussed in section 2.3.
One of the goals of this thesis is to bridge these levels of analysis by proposing neural
mechanisms for Bayesian computations. Since Bayes’ rule is based on probability theory,
an obvious first question to ask is: How are probability distributions represented in the
brain? The study of probabilistic computations by the brain is still in its early stages,
therefore which neural code or set of codes the brain uses is an open question. I discuss
some of the common proposals for neural coding of probability distributions in the next
section.
2.5 Neural Coding of Probability
Neural activity is generally thought to encode low-dimensional values. For instance, neu-
rons in the middle temporal (MT) visual area are interpreted as encoding the direction of
motion while the neurons in the primary visual cortex (V1) are interpreted as encoding
orientation. Additionally, vector representations have also been found in a wide variety
of neural systems. For instance, neurons in the monkey motor cortex have been found to
represent arm movements using a weighted vector code. Moreover, besides direction of mo-
tion, neurons in MT have been found to simultaneously encode speed, contrast, disparity,
attention, and spatial extent. Similarly, besides orientation, neurons in V1 simultaneously
encode spatial frequency and disparity. There are also large contextual influences in each
case, which bring in more dimensions (corresponding to the other parts of the visual space).
Over the span of last decade or two, several groups have proposed that neural activity
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might also encode functions of variables, i.e., probability distributions that are high (in-
finite) dimensional. This indicates that neural computations must be able to manipulate
these distributions according to the rules of probabilistic inference, while at the same time
staying faithful to the constraints imposed by the neural substrate, i.e., the brain. In or-
der to understand how such computations are possible at the neural level, we first need
to discuss the neural codes. Several groups have proposed theoretical schemes for neural
coding of probability distributions. I review the prominent ones in this section.
2.5.1 Probabilistic population codes
Probabilistic population codes describe one possible way of how the brain might use pop-
ulation activities for probabilistic computations. Proponents of this kind of code claim
that instead of encoding the value of a stimulus, the firing pattern of a neural population
encodes a probability distribution, p(R|X) over the possible values of a stimulus X, where
R is the firing rate of the neural population (Ma et al. 2006, Jazayeri and Movshon 2006,
Shi and Griffiths 2009). Note that p(R|X) can be seen as the likelihood of stimulus X, that
reflects the probability of the firing pattern given the stimulus X. The stimulus represented
by the neural population can thus be recovered through Bayesian decoding. Under this
code, neural operations performed on the neural populations correspond to manipulations
of the corresponding likelihood functions, and uncertainty is implicitly represented in the
population activity.
In variants of this coding scheme, the likelihood over the stimuli is proportional to the
activity of the neural population (instead of being directly encoded in the neural activity).
For instance, Jazayeri and Movshon (2006) propose that the contribution of each neuron
in the neural population to the log of the likelihood function encoded by the population,
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is given by the product of the neuron’s response and the logarithm of its tuning curve.
To use this code for making predictions, one needs to assume some form of neural
variability p(R|X), e.g, Poisson-like variability is one of the commonly used family of
distributions. Fetsch et al. (2012) trained monkeys to perform a head discrimination task
from visual and vestibular cues, randomly varying cue reliability. Assuming a Poisson-like
probabilistic population code, they decoded likelihoods from neural responses in the dorsal
medial superior temporal (MSTd) cortex. This is the area where visual and vestibular
cues for self-motion are integrated. They were able to accurately predict the monkey’s cue
integration behavior with a moderate deviation from the optimal prediction.
2.5.2 Sampling codes
The sampling codes assume that the probability of a variable of interest is directly mapped
on to the firing rate of neurons. Under this code, neurons correspond to variables, and
their firing encodes the distribution of the variables. At a given point in time, the activity
of a neuron is a sample from the distribution that needs to be represented (Hoyer and
Hyva¨rinen 2003, Moreno-Bote et al. 2011, Fiser et al. 2010). For instance, to encode a
distribution p(Z|X), a neuron can be used corresponding to variable Z such that it has
firing rates that are samples from the distribution p(Z|X). A higher mean firing rate of
the neuron would imply that a large value of variable Z is most probable, while a lower
mean firing rate would imply that a small value of Z is most probable. A higher variability
in the firing rate over time represents a higher uncertainty.
The sampling hypothesis leads to the prediction that the distribution of spontaneous
activity of a neuron might reflect the statistics of the environment. This prediction is
consistent with the finding of Berkes et al. (2011) in the ferret visual cortex where the
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neural activity was found to reflect the environmental statistics. However, sampling codes
also predict that the firing rate variability of the neuron encoding a distribution should
increase with uncertainty. This is inconsistent with the finding of Tolhurst et al. (1983) who
show that decreasing the contrast of a sinusoidal grating stimulus (increased uncertainty)
leads to a decrease in the firing rate variability of neurons in the visual cortex.
2.5.3 Explicit probability codes
Under this hypothesis, a probability distribution is directly encoded by the neural activity
of a population of neurons. The activity of a neuron tuned to a particular stimulus feature
is monotonically related to the probability density of that feature usually through a linear
or logarithmic transformation. This implies that the pattern of activity across the popu-
lation of neurons matches the shape of the probability distribution that the population is
encoding. For instance, to encode a distribution p(Z|X), a population of neurons can be
used such that each neuron has a preferred stimulus Zi. The firing rate of a neuron with
a preferred stimuli Zi reflects the value of the distribution at Zi. Neurons with preferred
stimuli Zi that have a lower probability have lower firing rates, while the neurons with pre-
ferred stimuli Zi that have a higher probability have higher firing rates. A wider activation
pattern across the population represents a higher uncertainty.
This coding scheme and its variants have been proposed and used by several groups
(Barlow 1969, Barlow and Levick 1969, Anastasio et al. 2000, Eliasmith and Anderson
2003, Anderson and Van Essen 1994, Zemel et al. 1998, Sahani and Dayan 2003). For
example, Barlow (1969) proposed a log probability code where the response of a neuron
tuned to a particular image feature (feature detector neuron), is proportional to the log
of the probability that their trigger feature is present. On the other hand, Anastasio
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et al. (2000) proposed that neuronal responses of deep superior colliculus neurons are
proportional to the probability that a target (source of stimulation) is present rather than
to its log probability.
Furthermore, other researchers have proposed techniques to take advantage of the fact
that probability distributions are functions. For instance, Eliasmith and Anderson 2003
have proposed that functions can be expressed as a sum of other functions called the basis
functions. Through this approach, a probability distribution can be expressed as a linear
combination of basis functions using a set of coefficients. Hence, the distribution can be
represented by encoding this set of coefficients in the neural activity. One of the advantages
of using this approach is that it requires lower number of resources (e.g., fewer neurons)
relative to other explicit coding proposals, for representing the same distribution. This is
because through this approach, only the coefficients need to be encoded rather than the
entire original distribution.
2.6 Discussion
We have seen that Bayesian models of cognition have been used to understand a wide range
of cognitive phenomenon that involve uncertainty. These range from visual perception and
motor control to high-level reasoning and inference. This wide range suggests that Bayesian
models may provide a link between the high-level and low-level cognition, thus bridging
across the levels of analysis described in section 2.3.
Some neural coding schemes have already been proposed in an attempt to bridge the
gap between abstract high level Bayesian models and their neural realizations (section
2.5). However, the study of Bayesian computations in the brain is still in its early stages
and many open questions remain unanswered. For instance, an important open question
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is whether probabilistic neural computations in the brain are optimal or suboptimal? In
the context of Bayesian computations, suboptimality can be caused by neural networks
implementing approximate computations. For instance in section 2.5.3, we saw that high
dimensional distributions can be approximated by computing basis functions. Another
cause of suboptimality might be incompletely learned beliefs (priors). For instance, during
development, children learn about the world through their interaction with it. Their beliefs
about the world change as they learn, and hence the inferences that they make might be
suboptimal since their beliefs may not match the reality of the world. Another open
question is: What are the learning mechanisms that enable the brain to update these
beliefs? Though we know from psychological studies that humans have different types
of beliefs about different phenomena in the world, it is unclear whether these beliefs are
represented differently and whether it is neurally plausible to integrate different beliefs and
to use the learned beliefs in analogous situations.
These are just a small subset of the unanswered questions regarding probabilistic com-
putations in the brain. Clearly, additional theoretical and experimental work needs to be
done to answer these question. In this thesis, I focus on the theoretical side and present a
neural model to propose answers to some of these questions, with the goal of exploring the
computational and neural underpinnings of human inference. Though I compare the model
results to human behavioral data, conducting experiments to explicitly test the theoretical
schemes proposed is left for future work. In the next chapter, I explain the framework
used for building the said neural model, and show how explicit probability codes can be
implemented to represent probability distributions in spiking neural populations within
this framework.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Neuroscience
3.1 Introduction
Computational Neuroscience is the study of brain function in terms of information pro-
cessing properties of the structures (neurons, synapses, circuits) of which it is composed.
Researchers in this field use quantitative tools to understand what computations are per-
formed in the brain, and how these computations give rise to behavior.
Traditionally, the field of computational neuroscience has worked at the Implementation
level. It has taken a bottom-up approach, starting with the study of single neural cells,
followed by small and large networks of cells through detailed mathematical models of single
cells and small networks. On the contrary, the field of cognitive science has traditionally
worked at the computational level. It has taken a top-down approach, starting with the
study of behavior of living beings followed by an attempt to understanding how the brain
facilitates these behaviors. Given these two different approaches to understanding the
brain, it is important to bridge these levels of analysis (as explained in sections 2.3, 2.4).
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One of the goals of this thesis is to bridge the gap between computational neuroscience
and cognitive science through the development of neural models that can reproduce human
behavior.
In this chapter, I provide a summary of the computational methods used to build such
neural models. These models are used to frame hypotheses that can be directly tested
by current and future biological and psychological experiments. Specifically, the models
presented in this thesis were built using the methods of the Neural Engineering Frame-
work (NEF; Eliasmith and Anderson, 2003). The NEF specifies a method to implement
a wide variety of functions using biologically plausible neuron models, and can be used
to translate a mathematical description of a dynamical system to a spiking neural model
(Eliasmith 2005, Singh and Eliasmith 2006). Thus, the NEF provides a well-defined way to
explore how biologically plausible neural systems can implement dynamical functions. The
NEF has been used to build a wide variety of neural models, including the current largest
functional brain model (Eliasmith et al., 2012). Other neural systems modeled using the
NEF include the spinal circuits in lamprey for controlling swimming, parts of the inner ear
and brain stem for controlling a vestibulo-occular reflex, horizontal eye position control,
directed arm movements and working memory (Eliasmith and Anderson 2003, Eliasmith
2013).
Importantly, in this chapter, I also detail how the NEF can be used for neural coding
of probability distributions using an explicit probability code. An efficient coding scheme
is proposed through the use of basis functions, which greatly reduces the neural resources
required to represent the high-dimensional distributions by compressing them to a low-
dimensional space. These low dimensional distributions are directly encoded by the neural
activity of a population of neurons.
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3.2 The Neural Engineering Framework
How do neurobiological systems represent the world? How do they use those representa-
tions through transformations to guide behavior? These are some of the central questions
facing computational neuroscientists today. The Neural Engineering Framework (NEF)
provides a neuroscientifically respectable approach to building biologically constrained
models of neurobiological systems using the quantitative tools of engineering (e.g., dynam-
ical systems theory, statistical inference, signal processing etc.; Eliasmith and Anderson,
2003). More precisely, it is a mathematical theory that provides methods for implementing
algorithms on vector spaces in spiking neural networks, and through those methods, de-
scribes how biologically plausible neural systems can implement a wide variety of dynamical
functions.
The NEF is based on three principles—representation, transformation, and dynamics—
which specify how information can be represented in neural populations, how these rep-
resentations can be transformed to compute functions, and how the interactions between
these representations gives rise to dynamics in neural systems respectively. These principles
are described in detail in the following sections.
3.2.1 Principle 1 – Representation
In order to characterize representation in a neural system, we need to specify encoding
and decoding procedures. The principle of representation specifies a way of representing
information in populations of neurons by identifying encoding and decoding strategies. It
states that the activity of a neural population “represents” information in an underlying
vector space. This information is represented as time-varying vectors of real numbers by
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populations of neurons through nonlinear encoding (defined by the neuron tuning curves)
and weighted linear decoding over the neural populations.
In general, a population of neurons has activities ai(x), which encode an n-dimensional
stimulus vector, x = [x1, x2, . . . , xn], through the encoding given by:
ai(x) = Gi [Ji(x)] , (3.1)
where ai(x) are the activities of population of neurons, Gi [·] is the nonlinear transfer
function describing the neuron’s spiking response, and Ji(x) is the current entering the
soma of the neuron. The response function Gi [·] is determined by the intrinsic properties
of the neuron e.g., absolute refractory period, resistances, capacitances, etc. that are
typically used to model single neuron behavior. While various neural models with their
own characterization of Gi [·] can be used to model single neuron behavior in the NEF, I
have chosen Gi [·] to be the leaky integrate-and-fire (LIF) neuron model for purpose of the
models presented in this thesis. The soma current is defined by:
Ji(x) = ρi 〈ei,x〉n + J biasi , (3.2)
where Ji(x) is the current in the soma, ρi is a gain and conversion factor, x is the
stimulus vector to be encoded, ei is the encoding vector that corresponds to the “preferred
stimulus” of the neuron—consistent with the standard idea of a preferred direction vec-
tor Schwartz et al. (1988)—and J biasi is a bias current that accounts for background activity.
The notation 〈·, ·〉n indicates an n-dimensional dot-product. The current Ji(x) is used as
the input to the LIF neuron model. The encoder, gain, and bias are randomly chosen, so
different neurons have different background firing rates and different maximum firing rates
along their preferred direction. This adds heterogeneity to the models by ensuring that
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different neurons respond differently to the same stimulus. Neurons in a population also
have different encoding vectors (ei) which implies that each neuron will fire most strongly
for a particular combination of values of stimuli. Thus the tuning curve of a neuron is a
function of the gain of the neuron (how quickly its activity rises), the bias (activity of a
neuron given no input), and the encoder (the direction in the input vector space that the
neuron is most responsive to).
Once the stimulus has been encoded by a population of neurons, it also needs to be
decoded in order to characterize the computations performable by the neural network.
With enough neurons, the originally encoded stimulus vector can be estimated from the
activities of the population of neurons through a decoding process given by:
xˆ =
∑
i
ai(x)di. (3.3)
The decoding vectors di (also known as “representational decoders”) are typically found
in the NEF by least-squares optimization, which I use in the models in this thesis (Elia-
smith and Anderson, 2003). The decoders resulting from this optimization complete the
definition of a population code over a set of neurons i for the representation of stimulus
x. As mentioned before, the code is defined by the combination of nonlinear encoding in
equation 3.1 and weighted linear decoding in equation 3.3. To summarize, NEF defines
neural representations as nonlinear encodings of vector spaces that can be linearly decoded.
Temporal representation
The population code does not explicitly address the issue of how information is encoded
over time. To do so, we can begin by considering the temporal code for each neuron in
isolation by taking the neural activities to be filtered spike trains as shown below:
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ai(t) =
∑
m
hi(t) ∗ δ(t− tm) =
∑
m
hi(t− ti,m), (3.4)
where δi(·) are the spikes at time tm for a given neuron i, generated by Gi [·] and hi(t)
are the linear decoding filters. We can compute the optimal filters for decoding using the
NEF, however to make my models biologically plausible, I have chosen these filters (hi(t))
to be the postsynaptic currents (PSCs) induced in subsequent neurons by the arrival of a
spike. Eliasmith and Anderson (2003) have shown that this assumption causes minimal
information loss, which can be further reduced by increasing the population size.
This temporal code can be combined with the population code defined before (equa-
tions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3), to provide a general population temporal code for vectors. The encoding
and decoding equations for such a code are given by:
δ(t− tim) = Gi
[
ρi 〈ei,x〉n + J biasi
]
(3.5)
xˆ =
∑
i,m
hi(t− ti,m)di. (3.6)
3.2.2 Principle 2 – Transformation
Transformations of neural representations are functions of vector variables represented by
neural populations. The principle of transformation describes a way to compute functions
on neural representations in a biologically plausible way. Neurons communicate through
synapses, and when a neuron spikes, it releases neurotransmitters across the synapse that
causes some current to be imparted to the post-synaptic neuron. The NEF summarizes the
many factors affecting the amplitude of the imparted current through a scalar connection
weight representing the strength of the connection between the two neurons. To compute
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any function on a connection, we set the connection weights between the two populations
to be the product of the decoders in the first population and the encoders of the second
population. The decoders can be determined based on the function we wish to compute.
For example, to compute a transformation f(x) when two neural populations are con-
nected, instead of finding the representational decoders di to extract the originally encoded
variable x, we can re-weight the decoding to specify some function f(x) other than iden-
tity. In other words, we can find the decoders d
f(x)
i (also known as “transformational
decoders”). In a communication channel, representational decoders di are computed by
the least squares optimization 〈||xˆ− x||〉x. To perform a transformation f(x), instead of
finding the representational decoders we can find the transformational decoders d
f(x)
i by
using least-squares optimization to minimize the difference between the decoded estimate
of f(x) and the actual f(x) given by 〈||xˆ− f(x)||〉x. This results in the transformation:
xˆ =
∑
i
ai(x)d
f(x)
i . (3.7)
Both linear and nonlinear functions of the encoded vector variable can be computed in
this manner (Eliasmith and Anderson, 2003).
Encoders/Decoders v.s. Weights in Standard Artificial Neural Networks
In the NEF, when two neural populations having N and M neurons and D dimensions
each are connected, instead of an N ×M connection weight matrix, we have an N × D
decoder matrix and a D ×M encoder matrix. This provides for a huge speedup to the
neural networks built using NEF as compared to the standard artificial neural networks
which solve for an N×M connection weight matrix, since solving for these smaller matrices
is relatively easier (as long as N >> D and M >> D).
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The equivalent synaptic weight matrix for computing the function f(x) in the NEF is
given by ωij = ρjejd
f(x)
i , where i indexes the presynaptic population, j indexes the postsy-
naptic population, and d
f(x)
i are representational or transformational decoders. Thus, the
connection weights in the NEF are determined by both the decoding of outgoing signals
from the presynaptic population and the encoding of incoming signals in the postsynaptic
population. This implies that changing a connection weight will change the transformation
being computed as well as the tuning curve of the receiving neuron in the postsynaptic
population. This is exactly what is expected to happen as is well known from work in
artificial intelligence and computational neuroscience. The encoding/decoding distinction
is made in the NEF because it is useful for understanding the representations in, and the
functions performed by, the neurobiological system. However, neurobiological systems do
not necessarily need to respect this distinction in order to perform their functions.
3.2.3 Principle 3 - Dynamics
Though feedforward transformations are sufficient to describe some neural systems, many
neural systems require persistent activity through recurrent connections. The principle of
Dynamics states that when recurrent connections are introduced, the values represented
by neural populations can be considered as state variables in a dynamical system. The
equations governing the dynamics of such neurobiological systems can be designed and
analyzed using control theory methods, and translated into neural circuitry using the
principles of Representation and Transformation explained above.
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D
u(t) y(t)
x(t)x(t)
Figure 3.1: Block diagram of a linear time invariant system showing the input vector u(t),
the state vector x(t), and the output vector y(t). B is the input matrix, A is the dynamics
matrix, D is the feedthrough matrix and C is the output matrix. Figure adapted from
Eliasmith and Anderson (2003).
In general, NEF provides a method for directly converting any set of differential equa-
tions into a biologically plausible spiking network approximation of the dynamics described
by those equations (Eliasmith and Anderson, 2003). In this section, I explain how such a
mapping can be obtained through the NEF.
We begin with the state equations that summarize the linear control theory:
xˆ(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t)
yˆ(t) = Cx(t) + Du(t)
(3.8)
Here (refer to figure 3.1), vector x(t) is called the state vector. It contains variables
that collectively describe the internal state of the system, and summarizes the effect of all
past input. All future output depends only on the value of the state vector and the future
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input. Furthermore, u(t) is the input vector, y(t) is the output vector, A is the dynamics
matrix, B is the input matrix, C is the output matrix, and D is the feedthrough matrix.
h(t)B'
A'
x(t)u(t)
Figure 3.2: Block diagram of a neural population implementing a linear system, showing
the input vector u(t), the state vector x(t). B′ is the neural input matrix, A′ is the neural
dynamics matrix, and the transfer function h(t) describes the synaptic dynamics given by
the post synaptic current. Figure adapted from Eliasmith and Anderson (2003).
The principle of dynamics states that the elements of the state vector, x (the state
variables) are the representations we find in neural populations, and the relations between
these variables (defined by the system matrices) are transformations implemented by these
populations. However, we need to relate the intrinsic dynamics of neural populations to
this standard control theoretic characterization. To translate this into a dynamical system,
the transfer function (integration in figure 3.1) needs to be a time varying description
of synaptic dynamics. As mentioned before in section 3.2.1, the post synaptic current
produced by the arrival of a spike is a good approximation of the synaptic dynamics, and
is given by:
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h(t) =
1
τ
e
−t
τ
h(s) =
1
1 + sτ
(frequency domain)
(3.9)
We need to characterize the neural dynamics with respect to this transfer function
as shown in the ‘neural’ control diagram in figure 3.2. In case of a neural system, each
subsystem describes a single population and hence the feedthrough and output matrices
can be taken to be included in the input matrix of the subsequent population.
Taking the Laplace transform of the equations 3.8 gives:
sx(s) = Ax(s) + Bu(s) (3.10)
y(s) = Cx(s) + Du(s), (3.11)
For a neural system, equation 3.11 will always be y(s) = x(s) as is clear from the block
diagram in figure 3.2. The neural system in the figure can be described as follows:
x(t) = h(t) ∗ [A′x(t) + B′u(t)]
x(s) = h(s)[A′x(s) + B′u(s)] (frequency domain)
(3.12)
Substituting Laplace transform h(s) from equation 3.9 gives:
x(s) =
1
1 + sτ
[A′x(s) + B′u(s)]
⇐⇒ sx(s) = τ−1[A′ − I]x(s) + τ−1B′u(s)
(3.13)
where I is an identity matrix.
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Equating right hand sides of equations 3.13 and 3.10 gives the relationship between
the dynamics and input matrices for the standard control system and the neural control
system as follows:
A′ = τA + I
B′ = τB
(3.14)
Thus, given any control system in the standard form shown in figure 3.1, we can use
equation 3.14 to determine the equivalent neural system in the standard form shown in
figure 3.2.
3.3 Neural Coding of probability using NEF
Recall that three different methods for neural coding of probability distributions were
discussed in section 2.5. In this section, I describe how the explicit probabilistic code can
be implemented using the NEF. Specifically, I adopt the approach of using basis function
representation, as described by Eliasmith and Anderson (2003).
3.3.1 Representing probability distributions in neural circuits
Probability distributions are essentially functions of some parameters. In section 3.2.1, I
described how vectors can be represented in neural circuits using the NEF. In this section, I
describe how functions can be represented in neural circuits by considering the relationship
between vector and function representation.
For any representation, we need to specify the domain of that representation. In case of
vectors, the domain is the subspace of the vector space that is represented by the neurons
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(e.g., the x vector). Function representations capture relationships between two continuous
variables, and this relationship should be reflected in the neural activity. For example, if
the change in pitch of a sound as a function of time is given by the function x(υ), then
the neural activity should represent the relation captured by the function x, leading to
changes in the neural activity as x(υ) changes. To represent a function, we can define a
function space analogous to a vector space. The domain of representation would then be
the subspace of the function space that is represented by the neurons, i.e., x(υ).
However if the function x(υ) is high dimensional, then representing it in population of
neurons would be very computationally expensive. For example, consider a population of
neurons with N neurons and D dimensions. As explained before in section 3.2.2, when this
population is connected to another D dimensional population with M neurons, instead of
an N × M connection weight matrix, we have a N × D decoder matrix and a D × M
encoder matrix in the NEF. In case of a high-dimensional function representation, D
becomes bigger in size, and this leads to an increase in the size of encoder and decoder
matrices, which explode to large sizes as D goes to infinity. Thus the neural network
can become computationally expensive to simulate when representing high-dimensional
functions/distributions.
Population Coding with Basis functions
In order to represent high dimensional functions in an efficient way, we can make the obser-
vation that the function spaces we are representing have a lot of redundancy. Therefore, we
can find a basis space for those functions so that we need to represent only a small number
of dimensions. This can be accomplished by computing the basis functions through Singu-
lar Value Decomposition. Projecting the high-dimensional function space onto these basis
functions converts it to a low-dimensional space. The functions in this low-dimensional
33
space can then be more efficiently represented in neurons (for an example, refer to section
4.4.4: cortical2).
Formally, we can define the function domain of representation by parameterizing the
set of represented functions by an n-dimensional vector of coefficients k = [k1, k2, . . . , kn].
These define any function of interest over a fixed set of basis functions φ(υ) as follows:
x(υ; k) =
n∑
j=1
kjφj(υ), for k ∼ p(k). (3.15)
Thus we define a particular probability distribution p(k) by limiting the space spanned
by the basis φ(υ) to some subspace of interest depending on the application. This is also
the domain over which the optimization to find the decoders in equation 3.3 is performed.
Next, we define population encoding and decoding analogous to that in equations 3.1
and 3.3 for functions:
ai(x(υ; k)) = ai(k) = Gi
[
ρi 〈ei(υ),x(υ; k)〉n + J biasi
]
(3.16)
xˆ(υ; k) =
∑
i
ai(k)di(υ), (3.17)
where ei(υ) and di(υ) are the encoding and decoding functions of the neurons. We
project these functions onto the same basis φ(υ) used to identify the function space. For
simplicity, we assume that φ(υ) is an orthonormal basis – an analogous derivation for a
bi-orthonormal set can be found elsewhere (Eliasmith and Martens, 2011). Hence, we get
the following encoding and decoding functions:
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ei(υ) =
n∑
j=1
eijφj(υ) (3.18)
di(υ) =
n∑
j=1
dijφj(υ), (3.19)
where eij and dij identify the n coefficients that represent the encoding and decoding
functions in φ(υ) basis for each neuron. We now substitute the encoding function into
equation 3.16:
ai(x(υ; k)) = Gi
[
αi
(∑
m,n
knφn(υ)eimφm(υ)
)
+ J biasi
]
= Gi
[
αi
(∑
m,n
kneimδmn
)
+ J biasi
]
= Gi
[
αi
(∑
n
knein
)
+ J biasi
]
= Gi
[
αi 〈ei,k〉n + J biasi
]
.
(3.20)
This way, function encoding is expressed as vector encoding identical to equation 3.5.
Similarly, function decoding can also be expressed as vector decoding as follows:
kˆ =
∑
i
ai(k)di. (3.21)
To summarize, I have shown that it is mathematically equivalent to talk in terms of
(finite-dimensional) function spaces or (finite-dimensional) vector spaces. Since probability
distributions are most generally functions, we can approximate them as high-dimensional
vectors over a fixed set of basis functions using the NEF.
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In section 3.2.2, we saw how transformations can be computed on vector representations
in the NEF. Since distributions can be treated as vectors, the same methods can be used
to compute transformations on representations of these distributions as well.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, I presented a theoretical framework called the NEF that can be used to
build neural models of cognition. The goal of this framework is to understand neural
systems using the tools of engineering. The framework synthesizes different approaches
in computational neuroscience, integrating ideas from neural coding, neural computation,
control theory, dynamics, and probability theory.
Three principles of the NEF were presented: representation of signals by neural popu-
lations, transformations of these representations through neuronal weights called decoders,
and integration of control theory and neural dynamics to understand neural systems. Ad-
ditionally, the intimate relationship between the vector and function representations was
shown, where function representations can be implemented as vector representations with
respect to some orthonormal basis (φ(υ)). Since probability distributions are essentially
functions, the framework provides an efficient neural code for probability distributions.
Given these characterizations, the framework can be used to understand the functional
organization and operation of nervous systems from cellular level to the level of large-scale
networks. I use this framework for building the neural network models presented in this
thesis. In the next chapter, I use this framework to build a neural model for learning
priors in a biologically plausible way, such that the learned priors can be used for Bayesian
inference. The model attempts to explain how people might update their beliefs (priors)
as a result of their life experience. The model is built at the algorithmic level and is
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constrained by the implementation level details, e.g., synaptic time constants based on
neurotransmitters, neuron properties like tuning curves, etc. In chapter 5, I show how
people may use these learned beliefs to make inferences.
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Chapter 4
A Spiking Neural Model for Learning
Priors
4.1 Introduction
The Bayesian framework has successfully described performance in many cognitive tasks
where sensory information is combined with prior assumptions. It has also been shown
that the prior knowledge of statistical regularities in the environment allows humans to
make accurate estimations. For example Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) asked people to
make predictions about the duration or extent of everyday phenomena, such as human
life spans or the box-office earnings of movies, and showed a close correspondence between
people’s implicit probabilistic models and the statistics of the world.
However, whether the priors that we use for our inferences in different situations are
hard-wired or learned in response to environmental statistics is the subject of debate. A
human infant is born with some biological capacities for learning that are then realized
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in the environment surrounding a newborn. For example, it is generally agreed that new-
borns have an inherent sense of motion, space, numbers, and can distinguish animate from
inanimate objects ( Spelke and Kinzler 2007, Izard et al. 2009). However, the environment
surrounding a newborn also supplies structured information that assists in actualizing their
raw capacities. Thus, learning seems to be promoted by both the child’s biology and its
environment. It is thus plausible that some cortical areas represent hypotheses (some-
times learned, sometimes innate) regarding the properties of the world, which are used to
interpret complex and ambiguous sensory input.
Recall from section 2.3, that the three main levels that the brain can be studied at are
computational, algorithmic and implementation levels. In this chapter, I present a neural
model that illustrates the interdependence of these levels of analysis. The goal of the neural
model is to explore how the priors might be learned in the human brain. Specifically, I
show how priors can be learned from life experience and how this learning process could be
directed by existing hypotheses (assumptions at the evolution and learning levels) in the
brain. I begin at the computational level specifying the nature of the problem and the goals
that the brain needs to achieve, and then transition to the algorithmic and implementation
levels. The resultant neural mechanisms for learning priors are not specific to a particular
task, but can generalize to different inference tasks.
4.2 Cognitive Tasks
In order to demonstrate the working of the proposed neural model, I use the prediction tasks
proposed by Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006), where they evaluate how cognitive judgments
compare with optimal statistical inference by asking people to predict the duration or
extent of everyday phenomena. Here, I explain three of these phenomena: human life
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spans, reigns of pharaohs, and waiting times on the telephone. A group of 208 people
were asked to predict each of these quantities, after being presented by a question in a
survey format. The responses were recorded and compared with the predictions made by
a Bayesian model in each of these cases.
In the following sections, I describe each of these prediction tasks and their correspond-
ing Bayesian models proposed by (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006). Though I only use the
life span inference task to demonstrate the neural models presented in this thesis, I describe
two additional tasks below to show that the proposed neural model can be generalized to
other scenarios as well.
4.2.1 Life spans
Subjects were asked to predict the total life spans of people, given their current age. The
question was presented to them in the survey format shown below:
“Insurance agencies employ actuaries to make predictions about people’s life spans –
the age at which they will die based upon demographic information. If you were assessing
an insurance case for an 18-year-old man, what would you predict for his life span?”
Bayesian model
If ttotal indicates the total amount of time the person will live and t indicates his current
age, the task is to estimate ttotal from t. The Bayesian model used for this prediction task
computes a probability distribution over ttotal given t, by applying Bayes’ rule:
p(ttotal|t) = p(t|ttotal)p(ttotal)/p(t), (4.1)
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where:
p(t) =
∫ ∞
0
p(t|ttotal)p(ttotal) dttotal. (4.2)
In my model, I assume the maximum age to be 120 years. Thus, when calculating p(t)
in practice, the integral may be computed from 0 to 120.
Prior Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) use publicly available real-world data to identify
the true prior distribution p(ttotal) over life spans. As shown in figure 4.1A, the prior over
life spans is a skewed Gaussian distribution.
Likelihood The likelihood p(t|ttotal) is the probability of encountering a person at age
t given that their total life span is ttotal. Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) assume for
simplicity that we are equally likely to meet a person at any point in his or her life. As a
result, this probability is uniform, and is given by:
p(t|ttotal) = 1/ttotal, for all t < ttotal and
= 0, for t ≥ ttotal
(4.3)
Prediction function Combining the prior with the likelihood according to equation 4.1
yields a probability distribution p(ttotal|t) over all possible life spans ttotal for a person
encountered at age t. As is standard in Bayesian prediction, Griffiths and Tenenbaum
(2006) use the median of this distribution—the point at which it is equally likely that
the true life span is either longer or shorter—as the estimate for ttotal. This identifies a
prediction function that specifies a predicted value of ttotal for each observed value of t.
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Results Results obtained by Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) through this Bayesian
model are shown in Figure 4.1B.
(A) (B)
Figure 4.1: (A) Empirical distribution of the total life span ttotal. (B) Participants’ pre-
dicted values of ttotal for a single observed sample t. Black dots show the participants’
median predictions for ttotal. Solid line shows the optimal Bayesian predictions based on
the empirical prior distribution shown in A. Dotted lines show predictions based on a
fixed uninformative prior. Note: the fit between the human predictions (black dots) and
Bayesian predictions (solid line) looks spot on in this figure due to the compressed y-
axis, but Figure 5.6 shows a zoomed version revealing that this isn’t the case. Adapted
from Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006).
42
4.2.2 Reigns of pharaohs
Subjects were asked to predict the total reigns of pharaohs (monarchs of ancient Egypt),
given the length of their reign at a particular time in history. The question was presented
to them in the survey format shown below:
“If you opened a book about the history of ancient Egypt to a page listing the reigns
of the pharaohs, and noticed that at 4000 BC a particular pharaoh had been ruling for 11
years, what would you predict for the total duration of his reign?”
Bayesian model
If ttotal indicates the total amount of time a pharaoh reigned and t indicates the current
length of his/her reign at a given point in history, the task is to estimate ttotal from t. The
Bayesian model used for this prediction task also computes a probability distribution over
ttotal given t, by applying Bayes’ rule given by equations 4.1 and 4.2.
Prior Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) use the real-world data to identify the true prior
distribution p(ttotal) over reigns of pharaohs. This particular prior follows an Erlang dis-
tribution.
Likelihood The likelihood p(t|ttotal) is the probability that the length of reign of pharaoh
at a given point in history is t given that their total reign is ttotal. Again, for simplicity,
Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) assume that we are equally likely to encounter a pharaoh
at any point in his/her reign. As a result, this probability is uniform, and given by equation
4.3.
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4.2.3 Waiting times
Subjects were asked to predict the total waiting time on telephone, given the amount of
time they had already been on hold. The question was presented to them in the survey
format shown below:
“If you were calling a telephone box office to book tickets and had been on hold for 3
minutes, what would you predict for the total time you would be on hold?”
Bayesian model
Similar to the previous two tasks, if ttotal indicates the total amount wait time and t
indicates the amount of time one has already been on hold, the task is to estimate ttotal
from t. The Bayesian model used for this prediction tasks is also same as the previous two
tasks, given by equations 4.1 and 4.2.
Prior Again, publicly available real-world data was used identify the true prior distribu-
tion p(ttotal) over waiting times. It follows a Power Law distribution.
Likelihood As before, the likelihood is given by equation 4.3.
4.3 Learning Priors: Computational Level
Note that though the priors are different for the Bayesian models used for the three tasks
explained above, their likelihoods follow the same expression. Griffiths and Tenenbaum
(2006) show eight different tasks that have different priors, but the same likelihood. In
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general, the approach to prediction used in each of the tasks explained above, is applicable
to any problem in which the upper limit of a duration, extent or any other numerical
quantity needs to be predicted, given a sample drawn from that interval. However, different
phenomena will have different priors – one of the causes of substantial variation in the
predictions. Thus, a natural question that comes to mind is: How are these priors learned?
In this section, I lay the theoretical ground work for addressing this question.
I assume that priors that humans have about life spans (or pharaoh’s reigns, wait times,
etc.) are a result of their experiences encountering people of different ages (or different
reign lengths, wait times, etc.) in their daily lives. Thus the prior will be inferred from
the data that comes from life experience. I further assume that the prior is parameterized
by some unknown hyperparameters α, which are to be estimated from the observed data.
For instance, in the life span inference task, the observed data corresponds to the ages of
m distinct people given by X = {x1, . . . , xm}. Here, each random variable xi corresponds
to a separate t from the previous model. Likewise, I model each element of X as being
drawn independently from each element of Zsampled = {z1, . . . , zm}, which correspond to
the (unknown or hidden) life spans of these same m people. Each random variable zi is
drawn (or “sampled”) from the unknown prior, and corresponds to a separate ttotal from the
previous model. See figure 4.2 and section 4.4.2 for a detailed explanation. I now describe
three standard methods for determining a prior from observed data X, by obtaining an
estimate αˆ of the hyperparameters.
4.3.1 Marginal likelihood
If we do not know the actual prior, then the optimal solution can be found by trying them
all. That is, I directly find the hyperparameters αˆ that maximize the marginal likelihood
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of the observed data, L(α; X) (or equivalently the log-likelihood for numerical stability):
L(α; X) = p(X|α)
=
m∏
i=1
p(xi|α)
=
m∏
i=1
∑
zi
p(xi, zi|α)
=⇒ αˆ = argmaxαL(α; X)
= argmaxα logL(α; X)
= argmaxα
m∑
i=1
log
∑
zi
p(xi, zi|α).
(4.4)
Here, each observed sample xi ∈ X and zi ∈ Z where Z contains all possible values of
total life spans, which I assume to be from 1 to 120 i.e., Z = {1, 2, . . . , 120}. I also assume
that X ⊂W where W is the set of whole numbers.
In general, however, the procedure described above is intractable, since it requires
that we iterate over all combinations of α and Z. This motivates near-optimal iterative
procedures such as the widely-used expectation maximization algorithm (Dempster et al.,
1977).
4.3.2 Expectation Maximization
Below I work out the details of the Expectation Maximization (EM) procedure for the
case where the hyperparameters are α = (µ, σ2), i.e., the prior is assumed to be normally
distributed with unknown moments. I begin by simplifying the expectation function using
independence and other known facts about the model:
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Q(α|α(t)) = EZ|X,α(t) [logL(α; X,Z)]
=
m∑
i=1
Ezi|xi,α(t) [logL(α;xi, zi)]
=
m∑
i=1
∑
zi
p(zi|xi, α(t)) log p(xi, zi|α)
=
m∑
i=1
∑
zi
T (xi, zi) log (p(xi|zi)p(zi|α))
=
m∑
i=1
∑
zi
T (xi, zi) log (p(zi|α)/zi) ,
(4.5)
where I have defined:
• T (xi, zi) := p(zi|xi, α(t)) to be some fixed function with respect to α(t).
• p(xi, zi|α) = p(xi|zi)p(zi|α), with α(t) included, since p(xi|zi, α) = p(xi|zi) by as-
sumption.
• Substituting p(xi|zi) = 1/zi for all zi is acceptable since T (xi, zi) = 0 for zi ≤ xi by
definition.
Next, I simplify the log expression using the assumed model of the prior, with unknown
α = (µ, σ):
log (p(zi|α)/zi) = log
(
1√
2σ2pi
e−
(zi−µ)2
2σ2
)
− log zi
= −1
2
(
(zi − µ)2/σ2 + log σ2 + log (2pi) + 2 log zi
)
,
(4.6)
and then differentiate this with respect to µ:
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∂ log (p(zi|α)/zi)
∂µ
= (zi − µ)σ2, (4.7)
and with respect to σ2:
∂ log (p(zi|α)/zi)
∂σ2
=
1
2
(zi − µ)2/σ4 − 1
2
/σ2
=
1
2
(
(zi − µ)2 − σ2
)
/σ4.
(4.8)
By linearity of differentiation, the derivatives of Q(·) are zero when:
∂Q(α|α(t))
dµ
=
m∑
i=1
∑
zi
T (xi, zi)(zi − µ)σ2 = 0
⇐⇒ µ =
∑m
i=1
∑
zi
ziT (xi, zi)∑m
i=1
∑
zi
T (xi, zi)
,
(4.9)
and similarly:
∂Q(α|α(t))
dσ2
=
m∑
i=1
∑
zi
T (xi, zi)
1
2
(
(zi − µ)2 − σ2
)
/σ4 = 0
⇐⇒ σ2 =
∑m
i=1
∑
zi
(zi − µ)2T (xi, zi)∑m
i=1
∑
zi
T (xi, zi)
.
(4.10)
Finally, the generalized Bayes’ rule gives:
T (xi, zi) = p(zi|xi, α(t)) = p(zi, xi|α
(t))∑
zi
p(zi, xi|α(t)) ,
which may be computed via Eq. 4.1. Also since T (·) is a probability density function
over zi, note that:
m∑
i=1
∑
zi
T (xi, zi) =
m∑
i=1
1 = m.
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Therefore, each EM iteration must make the update α(t+1) = (µ(t+1), σ(t+1)), where:
µ(t+1) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
zi
zip(zi, xi|α(t))∑
zi
p(zi, xi|α(t))
σ(t+1) =
√√√√ 1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
zi
(zi − µ(t+1))2p(zi, xi|α(t))∑
zi
p(zi, xi|α(t)) .
(4.11)
This converges to some locally optimal estimate of the hyperparameters. For initial
α(0) chosen sufficiently close to the global optimum αˆ given by equation 4.4, this converges
to the optimum.
This provides a tractable procedure for updating the prior. In particular, I begin with
some initial guess at the hyperparameters, and then update them iteratively to better
explain the observed data. In practice only a few iterations are required (results not
shown). Once I have an estimate of the hyperparameters αˆ, the prior p(ttotal|αˆ) is then
known.
4.3.3 Online Expectation Maximization
Though EM provides a tractable procedure for updating the prior, each iteration in EM
requires all observed ages of m distinct people (equation 4.5). In other words, all observa-
tions X = {x1, . . . , xm} are required to even begin learning. This seems counterintuitive for
human cognition since humans do not wait for all or m number of observations before they
start learning. On the contrary, I presume humans usually learn from their experiences as
they encounter them.
This further motivates online iterative procedures such as the incremental and step-
wise expectation maximization algorithms (Liang and Klein, 2009). These algorithms are
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stochastic versions of the EM algorithm, and allow updating of parameters with each in-
coming observation. One weakness of incremental EM is that its memory requirements
grow linearly with the number of observations. Since humans have limited memory, in-
cremental EM does not satisfy the memory constraints imposed by the brain. Memory
requirements of Stepwise EM, on the other hand, remain constant with an increasing num-
ber of observations, making it a suitable choice. Note that this is an example where the
implementation level is providing constraints for the computational level description.
Formulation for Stepwise EM is as follows:
λ← initialization; l = 0
foreach observation i = 1,...,m :
s′i =
∑
zi
T (xi, zi) log (p(zi|α)/zi)
ml = (l + 2)
−β
λ = (1−ml)λ+mls′i
α(t) = argmax(λ), l← l + 1
(4.12)
According to the generalized Bayes rule:
T (xi, zi) = p(zi|xi, α(t)) = p(zi, xi|α
(t))∑
zi
p(zi, xi|α(t))
where:
p(zi, xi|α(t)) = p(xi|zi)p(zi|α(t))
(4.13)
Here s′i is the sufficient statistics for the i -th observation and λ is the weighted sum of
statistics corresponding to the current observation and the previous observations. Instead
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of summing these over m observations as in the regular EM algorithm (equation 4.5), here
I interpolate between λ and s′i based on a stepsize ml, where l is the number of updates
made to λ so far. Thus Stepwise EM leads to a stochastic process where I approximate
the update in each iteration with a single sensory observation. However, since a single
sample is a bad approximation, I interpolate between the current observation (s′i) and the
set of statistics corresponding to the previous observations (current λ). According to the
results from stochastic approximation literature,
∑inf
l=0ml = inf and
∑inf
l=0m
2
l < inf are
sufficient conditions to guarantee convergence to a local optimum. This implies that for
ml = (l+ 2)
−β, any value of β such that 0.5 < β <= 1 is valid. In general, smaller β would
lead to larger updates and quicker decay of the old sufficient statistics λ. Thus, small β
can lead to fast progress but can also generate instability (Liang and Klein, 2009). In my
model, I use β = 0.65.
In the next section, I describe neural mechanisms for implementing the iterative process
of the stepwise EM algorithm. Now that I have a computational level description of the
problem at hand, I can think about the neural representations (algorithmic level), and use
the knowledge at the implementation level (e.g., structure of neurons, synapses, plausible
networks) to constrain the possible computational operations and algorithms that can be
employed at the algorithmic level.
4.4 Neural Model
Figure 4.5 shows a schematic diagram of the neural model built for learning priors. In the
following sections, I first describe the prior space - a set of distributions assumed at the
evolution and learning levels; second, I describe the training data used to train the model;
and finally, I describe the neural model implemented at the algorithmic level constrained
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by the implementation level details.
4.4.1 Prior space
From the evolution level (section 2.3), we learned that humans are able to learn very effec-
tively from a few examples, partly due to the huge bank of prior knowledge. Deriving from
this, I assume that rather than learning completely from scratch, given either evolutionary
history, or personal history, or most likely a combination of both, our brain has a charac-
terization of the set of distributions most likely to capture real-world data. Thus, I assume
a set of prior distributions defined as a prior space of size M . These distributions belong
to three different families – Gaussian, Erlang and Power Law and the task is to estimate
which one of them is the prior corresponding to the total life spans. These three families of
distributions were chosen based on the psychological evidence presented by Griffiths and
Tenenbaum (2006), where they suggest that the prior beliefs informing people’s predictions
on a variety of tasks follow these distributions. For example, in section 4.2, we saw that the
priors people use for predicting life spans, Pharaoh’s reigns and waiting times on telephone
fall into these families. Some other tasks with priors from these families include predicting
poem lengths, and movie box office earnings.
Though I demonstrate the model using the life span inference task, the same model can
also be used to learn the priors for any of the tasks that have priors in these families, e.g.,
predicting the waiting times on telephone. In short I suggest a general approach that is
applicable to any problem that requires estimating the upper limit of a numerical quantity
given a sample drawn from that interval, and that has a Gaussian, Erlang or Power Law
prior. However, this approach can be further generalized as discussed in sections 6.3 and
6.4. For instance, the distributions in the prior space can be used as basis functions to
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learn priors which are their linear combinations. To make predictions for unfamiliar events
(for which they do not have sufficient direct experience), people might also use an adaptive
strategy where they may be able to identify the appropriate form of the distribution by
making an analogy to a more familiar phenomena in the same broadly defined class.
To construct the prior space, I randomly sample the hyperparameters of the three fam-
ilies of distributions from a range chosen based on the psychological evidence presented
by Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006). The probability density functions and the correspond-
ing parameter ranges are listed below.
1. A skewed form of the Gaussian distribution is used having three hyperparameters
with ranges: mean (µ) (89, 109), scale (σ) - a measure of std-deviation - (5, 20) and
shape (γ) - a measure of skewness - (-8, -4). The probability density function is as
follows:
Std. Gaussian probability density function (PDF) is given by:
φ(z;µ, σ) =
exp− (z−µ)
2
2σ2√
2piσ2
Std. Gaussian cumulative distribution function (CDF) is given by:
Φ(z;µ, σ) =
∫ z
− inf
φ(z)dz =
1
2
[1 + erf(
z − µ
σ
√
2
)]
where erf(z) is the error function.
Then the probability density function of the skewed Gaussian is given by:
f(z;µ, σ, γ) = 2φ(z)Φ(γz) where µ ∈ (89, 109), σ ∈ (5, 20), γ ∈ (−8,−4). (4.14)
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2. The Power law distribution used has a single hyperparameter: shape(γ) ranging (1,
5). The PDF of the power law is as follows:
f(z; γ) = cz−γ where γ ∈ (1, 5) and c is a constant. (4.15)
3. The Erlang distribution used has two hyperparameters with ranges: scale (σ) (25, 35)
and shape (γ) fixed at 2.0 following Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) and Shepard
(1987). The PDF of the Erlang distribution is as follows:
f(z; γ, σ) =
zγ−1 exp−z/σ
σγ(γ − 1)! where γ = 2 and σ ∈ (25, 35). (4.16)
I assume an equal number of distributions from each family to construct the prior space.
In other words, for a prior space of size M , the number of distributions belonging to each
family is M/3. In section 4.4.5, I present model results for two different prior spaces of
sizes M = 27 and M = 108.
4.4.2 Training data
Recall that one of the questions asked at the learning level (section 2.3) is: How do humans
learn from experiences of the natural world? To show how humans might learn from their
experiences, I assume that the neural model receives one observed age xi as input at
a time (as a human would on encountering people of different ages). The model uses
this observation to compute an initial estimate of the prior over the total life spans of
people, and keeps iterating (according to the Stepwise EM algorithm explained in section
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4.3.3) to improve the prior estimate until the next observation is received as input. As it
receives more observations, it interpolates between the current observation and statistics
from previous observations (stored in memory) to estimate the optimal prior.
XZ?
m
Figure 4.2: Hierarchical Bayesian Network showing dependencies between variables using
the plate notation. These dependencies are used to generate the training data for the
neural model. The variables in the shaded circles are observable to the neural model for
training, while the empty circles represent latent variables.
The observations xi used to train the model are generated using a two-stage hierarchical
Bayesian network shown in figure 4.2. The Bayesian network is depicted using the plate
notation, where the rectangle or plate is used to group the variables in the model that repeat
together, with number of repetitions of the subgraph in the plate written on the bottom
right corner. Shaded circles indicate observable variables, i.e., ones that would be visible
to the neural model for training, and the non-shaded circles indicate latent variables, i.e.,
variables that are not directly observed but are inferred by the neural model. The directed
edges indicate dependencies between variables, for instance, in this case each element of
X is conditionally dependent on each element of Zsampled, which in turn is sampled from
the true prior conditioned on the set of hyperparameters α. This is detailed in the next
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paragraph.
Recall from section 4.3, that the prior is parameterized by a set of hyperparameters
α and the goal is to infer them from the observed ages of m distinct people given by
X = {x1, . . . , xm}. I generate the observed data in the forward direction (α −→ Z −→ X).
Each element of Zsampled = {z1, . . . , zm} corresponds to the unknown life spans of the same
m people, and is a random sample drawn from the true prior distribution (conditioned on
α). Each element of X is drawn conditionally from each element of Zsampled. I model
xi|zi ∼ U [0, zi), meaning that we are equally likely to see a person at any time throughout
their life (based on the likelihood assumption stated in equation 4.3).
4.4.3 Neural Network Design
The goal of this section is to map the computational description for learning priors de-
scribed in section 4.3.3 to an algorithmic level description that is constrained by the im-
plementation level details of the brain.
Looking at the computational level description, the following come to mind:
• First, I need to define neural representations (encoding and decoding scheme) for
probability distributions. This was already defined in section 3.3.
• Second, I need a way to store the weighted sum λ such that it can be maintained
across different observations. Information is usually stored in the brain in the form of
memories. Therefore, one possibility is to use a memory network to store λ. Such a
network can easily be built using principle 3 of the NEF (explained in section 3.2.3).
• Third, I need a way to implement the argmax() function in the neural network.
Winner-take-all (WTA) networks are commonly used neural mechanisms for selecting
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the largest value among a number of competing values. Several proposals for such
networks can be found in the cognitive science literature, and one or more of them
may be suitable for our purposes.
Now that I have identified the kinds of circuits or sub-networks that I would need in my
neural network, I can choose the specific version of these networks that are most suitable
for my model.
Memory Network
A'
B'   
  
  
  
  
u(t) x(t)
Figure 4.3: Schematic diagram of a neural integrator implemented using the NEF. The
circle represents a population of neurons and the square boxes represent the constant weight
matrices applied to the signals. Weight matrices for an integrator are given by: A′ = 1
and B′ = τPSC .
The most basic memory circuit that can be implemented using a neural network is an
integrator. An integrator sums a signal over time by continuously adding a given input
signal to its internal state. When the input signal is removed, the integrator maintains
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the internal state it had reached, thereby functioning like a memory. The dynamics of an
integrator in standard control theoretic form can be expressed as follows:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) (4.17)
where u(t) is the input vector, x(t) is the output vector that represents the current state
of the integrator, and A and B are the dynamics matrix and the input matrix respectively.
For an integrator, A = 0 and B = 1.
Recall from section 3.2.3 that the NEF can be used to convert any differential equation
into its biologically plausible spiking neural network approximation, using the principle of
dynamics. I now use equation 3.14 to derive the dynamics matrix A’ and the input matrix
B’ for the corresponding neural control system:
A′ = τA + I = τ0 + I = 1
B′ = τB = τ1 = τ
(4.18)
where τ is the time constant of the post synaptic current (PSC) of the neural population
representing x(t). The network diagram of the resulting neural integrator is shown in figure
4.3.
Though the neural integrator I have built is capable of acting as a memory unit, the
value x(t) that it holds is dependent on the time for which the input is presented to the
circuit. In other words, presenting a square pulse of height 1 as input for half a second
leads to a stored value of 0.5 in the integrator. However, presenting the same pulse for 1
second leads to a stored value of 1 in the integrator. What I want instead, is a circuit that
can hold its input (target value) regardless of how long its presented for. Choo (2010) has
proposed a gated difference integrator network to accomplish this.
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Figure 4.4: A schematic diagram of the gated difference integrator implemented using the
NEF. The circles represent populations of neurons and the square boxes represent the
constant weight matrices A′ = 1 and B′ = τPSC applied to the signals. The smaller circle
is the gating population and the bigger circle is the integrator population. Full circle(—•)
indicates an inhibitory connection which can be used for inhibiting the gating population
to enable the integrator to hold the previous value when the current input u(t) is zero.
A gated difference integrator is shown in figure 4.4. It consists of two neural populations,
a primary integrator population, and a gating population. The basic principle is to provide
an additional negative feedback to the integrator. The input to the integrator population
is provided through a gating population which also receives the negative of the currently
stored value. Thus the total input to the integrator population is the difference of the
current value and the target value u(t). Due to this, the integrator continues to receive an
input signal only until its state matches the target value. Once, the state of the integrator
matches the target value, its total input becomes zero (since the negative feedback fully
cancels the target signal u(t)), and the integrator holds its value. The gating population
can also be inhibited to disable any input to the integrator. Without any input, a recurrent
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connection with a long synaptic time constant (τ = 0.1s) ensures that the currently stored
value doesn’t change much over time (except for a small drift due to noise).
To summarize, a gated difference integrator is capable of holding a target value regard-
less of the amount of time it is presented for, and is therefore a suitable network for storing
the weighted sum λ in our neural model.
Winner-Take-All Network
A winner-take-all (WTA) mechanism determines the magnitude and identity of its largest
input. Such mechanisms have been proposed for various brain functions and have been
found to be consistent with a large body of psychological and neurobiological literature
(Smith and Ratcliff 2004, Bogacz et al. 2006). WTA networks are very commonly used as
components of cognitive models specially in models of action selection, attention (Lee et al.
1999, Itti et al. 1998, Koch and Ullman 1987) and decision making (Usher and McClelland
2001, O’Reilly 1998, Furman and Wang 2008).
For the purpose of my neural model, I use the winner-take-all mechanism called the
spiking independent accumulator (IA) model proposed by Gosmann et al. (2017). The
network diagram of the IA model is shown in Figure 4.5 (labelled “WTA Network”). It
is a two-layer spiking neural network built using the principles of the NEF. Given an n
dimensional input vector corresponding to the non-negative utilities of n different choices,
the desired output of the IA network is positive for the dimension with the highest utility
(“winner”) and zero for all others. To accomplish this, the first layer of the network consists
of n separate integrator populations (same as shown in figure 4.3) for accumulating each
input, and the second layer consists of n non-recurrent thresholding populations that receive
one-to-one input from the neural populations in the first layer. A thresholding neural
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population contains neurons which respond only to inputs above a certain threshold.
Note that there are no direct interactions among the accumulators in the first layer of
the network (i.e., they are ‘indepenent’). This is in contrast to some other winner-take-all
models which have direct competition between states, e.g, the leaky competing accumulator
model (Usher and McClelland, 2001). The competition in the IA model is enabled through
the second thresholding layer. Each neural population in the second layer projects back
to mutually inhibit all other neural populations in the first layer except the one it receives
input from, which it excites. Thus the largest input accumulates the fastest, and once
it reaches the threshold, it self excites and inhibits the accumulators corresponding to all
other inputs.
4.4.4 Model Implementation
I now use the components explained above to build the neural model for learning priors, and
demonstrate its function using the the life span inference task described in section 4.2.1.
Figure 4.5 shows the final network diagram of the neural model. Circles indicate neural
populations that represent information in spiking LIF neurons using principle 1 of the
NEF (section 3.2.1). The arrows connecting the neural populations are neural connections
that implement transformations and compute functions using the principle 2 of the NEF
(section 3.2.2). The dynamics of the recurrently connected neural populations are specified
using the principle 3 of the NEF (sections 3.2.3 and 4.4.3). The number of neurons and
dimensions represented by each neural population or sub-network are labelled as N and D
respectively. M indicates the size of the prior space used (explained in section 4.4.1). The
model was built using Nengo, a neural simulator based on the NEF (Bekolay et al., 2014).
In table 4.1, I briefly describe where each computation of the Stepwise EM algorithm given
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by equation 4.12 is implemented in the model, followed by details of neural implementation
under respective model components.
Sensory Cortical1 
Transform:
log(p(zi|A))
integrator
X1 X1'
X2 X2'
Xn Xn'
I
I
WTA Network
Sensory 
input
Memory Network
Transform:  p(zi|A) 
Compression from high to low dimensional space
gate
-1
A
gating signal
Cortical2 N=200
D=20
N=50D
D=M
N=150D
     D=M
N=2(130D)
        D=M(1-ml)?
mlsi'
?
?
integratorgate
-1
A
gating signal
A
A ?(t)
p(zi|?(t))
Figure 4.5: A schematic diagram of the neural model for learning priors. The circles
represent neural populations/networks. The rectangles group the neural populations into
subnetworks. The rounded box represents a node (non-neural). The flow of informa-
tion is denoted with arrows (→). Transformations are labelled along these connections.
Inhibitory connections are indicated with full circles(—•). The blue labels indicate the
quantity encoded by the spike trains propagating through the connections. The number
of neurons and dimensions represented by each population/network are labelled as N and
D respectively (M is the prior space size).
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Table 4.1: Mapping the Stepwise EM algorithm to the neural model.
Stepwise EM Neural Model
s′i =
∑
zi
T (xi, zi) log (p(zi|α)) Computed as a dot product between T (xi, zi) and
log (p(zi|A)), where A = {α1, α2 . . . αM}. Each αi corre-
sponds to a different prior distribution in the prior space.
T (xi, zi) is computed in the sensory node. log (p(zi|A)) is
the transform on the connection between the sensory node
and cortical1 neural population.
s′i is M dimensional, containing utilities corresponding to
each of the priors in the prior space.
ml = (l + 2)
−β Computed in the sensory node. β is a constant parameter
set to 0.65 (explained in section 4.3.3).
λ = (1−ml)λ+mls′i mls′i is computed in the sensory node.
(1 −ml)λ is computed in a node (not shown in figure 4.5)
that lies between the the memory network and cortical1.
This node receives the output from the memory network (λ)
as input.
The addition happens in the cortical1 neural population.
λ is M dimensional, and contains utilities corresponding to
each of the priors in the prior space.
α(t) = argmax(λ) Computed by the WTA network.
l← l + 1 Updated in the sensory node at the beginning of each iter-
ation. The length of each iteration was set to 1 second. The
model keeps iterating (to improve it’s estimate) with the
current utilities for 1 second, after which a new observation
is received as input and used to update the utilities.
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Training data: I assume 120 possible values of total life spans i.e., Z = {1, 2, . . . 120}.
This implies that Zsampled = {z1, z2, . . . zm} ⊂ Z and each of its elements is drawn ran-
domly from Z, based on their probability from the true prior distribution over Z (or ttotal).
This 120 dimensional true prior distribution over the life spans is shown in figure 4.1. Each
element of X = {x1, x2, . . . xm} is drawn conditionally from each element of Z as explained
in section 4.4.2. The model successively receives xi as input (one sample at a time). In the
rest of this section, I use zi to refer to the elements of Z (not the elements of Zsampled). I
also assume that X ⊂W.
Prior space: Prior space is constructed as explained in section 4.4.1. It consists of M
priors conditioned on their respective hyperparameters α. Each prior is 120 dimensional
and gives p(zi|α), i.e, a possible prior probability distribution over the total lifespans (see
figure 4.6 for examples of such distributions). The prior space is represented as a 120×M
dimensional matrix and we will refer to it as p(zi|A), where A = {α1, α2 . . . αM}. Each αi
corresponds to a different prior distribution in the prior space.
Sensory node
As shown in figure 4.5, the sensory node receives the input xi and computes T (xi, zi) ∗ml
using equation 4.13. Computing T (xi, zi) requires computing the posterior distribution
p(zi|xi, α(t)) as a product of the likelihood p(xi|zi) and the prior p(zi|α(t)). The denominator∑
zi
p(zi, xi|α(t)) is just a normalizing factor and can therefore be ignored.
For the first iteration, the model uses a random initial guess for the prior (or α(t)) to
compute p(zi|α(t)). In simple words, it randomly chooses an initial prior from the prior
space.
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The likelihood is computed using the following equation (explained before in section
4.2.1). It is a 120 dimensional distribution that gives the likelihood of each zi ∈ Z given
the current observation xi.
p(xi|zi) = 1/zi, for all xi < zi (and 0 for xi ≥ zi) (4.19)
Once I have the prior and the likelihood, T (xi, zi) is simply a 120 dimensional vector
given by the element-wise product of the two. Note that the ‘node’ object in Nengo does not
contain neurons and performs computations mathematically. However, this computation
has been abstracted here only for simplification purposes. It is possible to compute this
product using spiking neurons in a neurally plausible way, as will be shown later in chapter
5. The resulting product is then multiplied by the scalar ml to get T (xi, zi) ∗ml.
Cortical1
The connection from the sensory node to the cortical1 neural population computes the
transform log(p(zi|A)), i.e., the 120 ×M prior space matrix. This matrix is used as the
weight matrix on the connection and the transformation 〈(T (xi, zi) ∗ml)120, (p(zi|A))120∗M〉M
is computed using principle 2 of the NEF. The notation 〈·, ·〉M indicates a dot product or
a matrix vector product and the subscripts denote the dimensionality. This input to
cortical1 is thus an M dimensional vector, where each dimension represents the utility
of the corresponding prior in the prior space based on the current observation (mls
′
i from
equation 4.12).
To this point I have computed mls
′
i where s
′
i is given by (rewriting from equation 4.12):
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s′i =
∑
zi
T (xi, zi) log (p(zi|A)/zi)
=
∑
zi
T (xi, zi) log (p(zi|A))−
∑
zi
T (xi, zi) log (zi)
(4.20)
Notice that in my computation of s′i I have not accounted for the subtraction term in
equation 4.20. This is because this term leads to the dot product 〈(T (xi, zi))120, (log(zi))120〉120,
which gives a scalar value. Since the same scalar value gets subtracted from each of the
terms in the M dimensional vector (given by the first term in equation 4.20), subtracting
this scalar doesn’t make any difference to their values relative to each other. Recall that I
only care about the relative values of the elements in the M dimensional vector (each of
which correspond to a different prior in the prior space), since my goal is to compare them
and pick the most optimal prior.
The other input to cortical1 is feedback from the memory network, which provides
utilities based on the statistics from the previous observations ((1 − ml)λ from equa-
tion 4.12). For the first observation x1, the feedback from memory is zero since nothing
has been stored there yet. To summarize, cortical1 is an M dimensional neural popula-
tion that represents λ and also sends it to the memory network which stores it for future
use. It represents the M dimensional vector λ using 50 LIF neurons for each dimension.
Memory Network
The Memory network consists of two gated difference integrator units as shown in Fig-
ure 4.5. Each unit contains two neural populations per dimension, a primary population
integrator that has 100 neurons and a gate population that has 30 neurons. Each of
the units can act as a memory to store a target value as explained in section 4.4.3. The
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two units are gated out of phase such that when the first unit is open (receives input from
cortical1), the second unit is closed and sends its stored value to cortical1 in order to
add the summary statistics from previous observations to the current utilities. As a result,
the first unit gets updated summary statistics as input. Next, the first unit closes and the
second opens to shift the summary statistics to the second unit for the next iteration. Note
that the feedback from the memory network λ is multiplied by the factor 1−ml through
a node (not shown in the schematic), before it is sent to the cortical1 population.
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Figure 4.6: Root mean squared error (RMSE) of distributions relative to the true prior
(shown in black). Power Law distributions (not shown) have RMSE ranging from 0.03 to
0.05 relative to this prior. Note that the model picks these distributions during training,
i.e., the optimal distribution evolves over time.
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WTA Network
The other output connection from cortical1 provides the M dimensional input to the
independent accumulator WTA network (explained in section 4.4.3) that is used to imple-
ment the argmax(λ) operation in equation 4.12. The IA network is a two-layer spiking
neural network whose first layer consists of M separate integrator populations with 100
neurons each, and the second layer consists of M non-recurrent thresholding populations
with 50 neurons each. Recall from section 4.4.3 that the output of the IA network is
positive for the dimension with the highest utility (winner) and zero for all others. The
output connection from the WTA network uses the principle 2 of the NEF to compute the
transform p(zi|A). In other words the 120×M dimensional prior space matrix, p(zi|A) is
used as the weight matrix on this connection. The dot product of the WTA output with
this matrix gives the current optimal prior distribution corresponding to α(t) i.e., p(zi|α(t))
which is the input to the cortical2 population.
Cortical2
The 120 dimensional prior p(zi|α(t)) is then compressed to a 20 dimensional space by
computing basis φ20(υ) using the methods described earlier in section 3.3. The steps in
this process are listed below:
1. First I define a function space (analogous to a vector space) in order to specify the
domain of representation. Since I know that any prior distribution that I will need
to represent must lie withing the prior space, I define the function space to be the
same as the prior space.
2. Second, I compute the basis functions by drawing samples from the function space
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and performing Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) on those samples. SVD gives
singular vectors that form an orthonormal set, and the top singular vectors refer
to the ones associated with the largest singular values. To define a 20 dimensional
basis, I pick the top 20 singular vectors. Thus my basis set consists of 20 vectors
or functions φ20(υ) = {v1, v2 . . . v20}, each of which is 120 dimensional. Figure 4.7
shows this basis set.
3. Now that I have defined a basis set, any distribution that lies in the function space
can be expressed as a linear combination of the basis functions φ20(υ) using a 20
dimensional vector of coefficients k = {k1, k2 . . . k20} as shown below:
p(k) = k1v1 + k2v2 + k3v3 + .........+ k20v20
These coefficients limit the space spanned by the basis to the subspace of interest.
Computing the dot product of a particular basis function v1 with the given distribu-
tion gives:
v1.p(k) = k1v1.v1 + k2v2.v1 + k3v3.v1 + .........+ k20v20.v1
= k1 (since φ(υ) is an orthonormal set, vi.vj = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise)
(4.21)
This implies that 〈p(k)120, φ(υ)120∗20〉20 = k, i.e., the unique set of coefficients k used
for parameterizing the distribution of interest can be obtained by simply taking a
dot product of the distribution with the set of basis functions. In other words, a dot
product of the distribution with the basis set projects the high-dimensional distribu-
tion (120 dimensional in this case) to a low-dimensional space (20 dimensional in this
case). This reduces the number of resources required to represent the distribution,
since the number of neurons required to represent the coefficients k is significantly
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lower than that required to represent the original 120 dimensional distribution.
4. To reconstruct the distribution from the low-dimensional space (20 dimensional) back
to the high-dimensional space (120 dimensional), I make the following observation:
〈p(k)120, φ(υ)120∗20〉20 = k ⇐⇒ p(k) = 〈k20, transpose(φ(υ))20∗120〉120
Since φ(υ) is an orthonormal matrix, its inverse is same as its transpose. Thus, a
distribution can be projected back to the high-dimensional space by simply taking a
dot product with the transpose of the basis set φ(υ).
5. The basis φ(υ) is also used to determine the neuron encoders (as given by equa-
tion 3.18) and decoders (as given by equation 3.19) for the cortical2 population.
Specifically, the 120 dimensional function space is projected to the 20 dimensional
space using the basis set. The 20 dimensional function space is then used to sample
encoders and to compute the decoders.
The method outlined above provides for an efficient neural representation of the high-
dimensional distribution (current optimal prior p(zi|α(t))) in a 20 dimensional cortical2
population. The output from cortical2 is reconstructed back to the 120 dimensional
space, and used either along with the current or the next incoming sensory observation, xi
(in the sensory node), to continue the iterative process of learning the optimal prior.
Note that I project the prior distribution back to the high-dimensional space because
the posterior is being computed mathematically in the sensory node, so there is no ad-
vantage for computing it in the compressed space. However, in chapter 5, I show how the
computation to determine the posterior can be implemented in neurons. In that case, the
prior (and likelihood) is not reconstructed, since computing the posterior in the compressed
space is beneficial due to the significant reduction in the number of neurons required.
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Figure 4.7: Plots showing the basis set φ20(υ). (a) Plot showing the entire basis set, φ20(υ)
i.e., all 20 basis vectors that are 120 dimensional each. (b) Plot showing three randomly
selected basis functions from the set of 20 for clear visualization.
4.4.5 Results
I use a skewed Gaussian distribution (true prior for the total life spans shown in figure
4.1A) to generate the observations xi for training my model. Each observation is allowed
to cycle for three iterations before the next observation is provided. I test my model with
two different prior spaces of sizes M = 27 and M = 108 and evaluate its performance by
computing the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the optimal prior to which the model
converges, relative to the true prior distribution. Both prior spaces contain distributions
with RMSE ranging from 0 to 0.05. Figure 4.6 shows some of the distributions to which
the model converges during training. This is meant to graphically clarify the implication
of different RMSE values relative to the true distribution.
Figures 4.8(a, b) show the prior space of size M = 27. Figure 4.9a shows the results
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obtained from the neural model when this prior space is used. With only one observation,
the model picks the prior distributions with RMSE as high as 0.017. This implies that 25-
50% of trails converge to Erlang priors instead of the true Gaussian prior. However, with
just a few more observations, the model always converges to distributions with RMSE lower
than 0.007 implying that it converges to some Gaussian distribution close to the optimal.
On further increasing the number of observations, there is only a slight improvement.
Figure 4.9b shows the results obtained on using the prior space of size M = 108 shown
in Figures 4.8(c, d). In this case, the initial spread of errors is even higher (upto 0.020).
This is expected due to the increase in the size of the search space. The high error implies
that the model picks Erlang and Power Law distributions instead of the true Gaussian
prior in some trials. However, with an increase in the number of observations, the mean
RMSE decreases and quickly stabilizes after around 10 observations. Interestingly, given
enough observations, the model performs better with the larger prior space (M = 108) as
compared to the smaller prior space (M = 27). In particular, with 10 or more observations,
50% of the trials have RMSE lower than 0.0025 and most of the rest are lower than around
0.0035. These distributions are very close to the optimal prior as can be judged from
Figure 4.6. This performance improvement is due to the fact that a bigger prior space is
denser and thus allows for easier navigation through the search space, by preventing the
model from getting stuck in local minima. On the contrary, a smaller prior space is sparse
and more prone to getting stuck in the local minima.
72
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
zi
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
p
(z
i/
α
)
(a)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
zi
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
p
(z
i/
α
)
(b)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
zi
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
p
(z
i/
α
)
(c)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
zi
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
p
(z
i/
α
)
(d)
Figure 4.8: (a) Prior space with M = 27. (b) Prior space with M = 27, showing only
Gaussian and Erlang families for clarity. (c) Prior space with M = 108. (d) Prior space
with M = 108, showing only Gaussian and Erlang families for clarity.
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Figure 4.9: Results from the neural model when a skewed Gaussian distribution is the
true prior. The y-axis shows the root mean squared error relative to the true prior and
the x-axis shows the number of observations used for training the model. The red squares
show the mean and the red bar shows the median of the RMSE data from 100 trials.(a)
Prior space of size M = 27. (b) Prior space of size M = 108.
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However, an increase in the prior space size also leads to an increase in the number
of neurons required for the model. In general, number of neurons scale linearly with
prior space size M , and are given by: 460 × M + 200. One area for future work is to
explore whether this scaling can be further improved by applying the same methods of
dimensionality reduction that I use to represent the optimal prior in cortical2 ensemble
in my model. The M dimensional utilities represented by cortical1 ensemble can be
treated as a high-dimensional vector and a basis space can be computed to compress it
to a low-dimensional space. This would mean that the number of neurons required for
cortical1 ensemble and the Memory network would be significantly reduced, similar to
cortical2. This compressed representation can then be reconstructed before input to the
WTA network. Additionally, the prior space p(zi|A) and its log function are 120 × M
dimensional matrices stored in the weight matrices at two different connections in the
network. This encoding can also be made more efficient by compressing this matrix to a
low-dimensional space using the same basis set. Both these issues are discussed in detail
in section 6.3.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, I proposed neural mechanisms that may be used by humans for learning
priors from experiences of the natural world. The neural model built to accomplish this is
based on two assumptions: (1) The likelihood assumption from Griffiths and Tenenbaum
(2006) which is given by equation 4.3, and (2) Prior space assumption explained in section
4.4.1. Both these assumptions and their implications are discussed again in section 6.4.
The model is capable of learning priors for any task that satisfies these assumptions. I also
showed how the beliefs or priors can be represented in the brain during and after the learn-
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ing process using the methods outlined in section 3.3. Specifically, the computation of an
orthonormal basis set φ(υ), compression of a probability distribution to a low-dimensional
space, and its reconstruction back to a high-dimensional space were described in detail.
Through the process of building this model, I illustrated a systematic approach towards
building a neural model, that integrates different levels of analysis presented in section 2.3.
I started with the problem description at the abstract computational level in section 4.3,
made assumptions at the learning and evolution levels in section 4.4.1 and finally built the
model at the algorithmic level, where I proposed neural mechanisms constrained by imple-
mentation level details in section 4.4.4. This process demonstrates the interdependence of
these levels.
The model can be used to learn priors for a variety of psychological tasks, and I evalu-
ated its performance by training it on a life span inference task with the goal of learning
the prior on the life spans of humans. The results showed that for a prior space of size
M = 108, the model converges to the optimal or near optimal priors after being trained
with only around 10 observations. Though the model is able to successfully learn the prior,
it is not clear how these priors may be used for making inferences, and how the computa-
tions to do so might be realized in the human brain. This is the question that I address in
the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
A Spiking Neural Model for Bayesian
Inference
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we saw a neural model that can be used to learn priors for a wide
variety of inference tasks. I demonstrated how the model can learn the prior for the life
span inference task. However, to show that the neural representation of the learned prior
can be used to perform inference, I use this prior to infer life spans and then evaluate the
accuracy of the inference against human predictions.
In this chapter, I present a spiking neural model that is designed to perform Bayesian
Inference in a neurally plausible way. The model is general purpose and can be used to
infer a posterior distribution given a likelihood and a prior. The model is demonstrated
using the life span inference task. It uses the prior over the total life spans learned by
the previous model (presented in chapter 4) to infer the life spans of individuals given
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their current age. The predictions made by the neural model are then compared to human
predictions on this task. I show that the neural model matches human performance on
this task better than an ideal Bayesian model due to the use of neuron tuning curves.
5.2 Neural Model
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Figure 5.1: A schematic diagram of the neural model for Bayesian inference. The cir-
cles represent neural populations. The rectangles group the neural populations into sub-
networks. The rounded boxes represent nodes (non-neural). The flow of information is
denoted with arrows (→). The number of neurons and dimensions represented by each
population/network are labelled as N and D respectively.
Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of the neural model designed for performing general
Bayesian inference. In other words, given a prior and a likelihood, the neural model can
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combine both of them to compute a posterior distribution in accordance with the Bayes’
rule given by equation 4.1. Similar to the previous model, this model is also built using
the Nengo neural simulator based on the NEF.
In this section, I explain how this model can be used to infer life spans. Recall that
in the previous model presented in section 4.4.4, the sensory node used the prior from
the previous iteration, computed the likelihood based on the current observation xi and
used both these quantities to compute the posterior distribution p(zi|xi, α(t)). Importantly,
the posterior distribution was computed mathematically. For this model, I assume that
the prior distribution and the likelihood function are given from the previous model, and
show how the posterior distribution can be computed in a neurally plausible way. First, I
represent the given prior and likelihood distributions in neural populations. Next I use the
product network to compute the posterior distribution through an element-wise product of
the prior and likelihood. Once I have the posterior distribution, I use a prediction function
to obtain a prediction for the total life span from the posterior.
79
5.2.1 Product Network
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Figure 5.2: A schematic diagram of the Product Network. The circles represent neural
populations. The rectangles group the neural populations into subnetworks. The rounded
boxes represent nodes (non-neural). The flow of information is denoted with arrows (→).
N and D respectively indicate the number of neurons and dimensions in each sub-network.
Note that the non neural elements are shown here only for ease of understanding, and the
final simulated model does not have any non neural elements. It consists of only spikes
propagating through the connections, and connection weights.
Though multiplication is nonlinear, it has a well-characterized implementation in neurons
that does not require nonlinear interactions, and can be implemented accurately with the
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NEF. The product network makes use of this characterization. It computes the element-
wise product of two equally sized vector inputs using diagonal encoders (Gosmann, 2015).
For instance, given inputs b1 and b2 which are 20 dimensional each, the 20 dimensional
product b1b2 can be computed as follows:
b1b2 = 1/4(b
2
1 + 2b1b2 + b
2
2)− 1/4(b21 − 2b1b2 + b22)
= 1/4(b1 + b2)
2 − 1/4(b1 − b2)2
= 1/4((1, 1)T .b)2 − 1/4((1,−1)T .b)2
= 1/2[(e1.b)
2 − (e2.b)2]
(5.1)
where e1 and e2 are encoders (unit vectors) given by e1 = (1/
√
2, 1/
√
2) and e2 =
(1/
√
2,−1/√2).
Figure 5.2 shows a schematic diagram of the product network. It consists of two
subnetworks that compute the first and second square terms respectively in equation. 5.1.
These networks consist of 20 neural populations (one for representing each dimension).
While one of these networks receives the sum of inputs b1 + b2, the other receives the
difference of inputs b1 − b2 (due to the negative transform computed at the connection
from input b2). Each neural population (from 0 to 20) receives one dimension as input
from the input nodes. A square function is computed at the output connection from each
of these neural populations using the principle 2 of the NEF. Thus the output from the
two sub-networks is (b1 + b2)
2 and (b1 − b2)2 respectively. Finally, the connection from
the output nodes of these sub-networks to the output node of the product network (which
is the outer network containing the sub-networks) contains diagonal encoders e1 and e2.
This connection computes a transform of 0.5, thus giving the product b1b2 as the output.
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5.2.2 Model Implementation
To represent the prior and likelihood in neural populations, I again use the methods de-
scribed in section 3.3, following a process similar to cortical2 in the previous model
(section 4.4.4). Specifically, I define a basis φ20(υ) to span the space of each distribution.
To compute the basis I sample from a family of 120 dimensional distributions and do Singu-
lar Value Decomposition to obtain a 20 dimensional basis. This basis is used to determine
the encoders (as given by equation 3.18) used in the NEF simulation. The same basis is
used for the optimization to find the neuron decoders (as given by equation 3.19) that
are needed to perform the desired computations. Similar to the encoding and decoding
functions, the 120 dimensional prior and likelihood functions are also projected to the 20
dimensional space through weights over the basis. Note that separate bases φ20(υ)
prior and
φ20(υ)
likelihood are computed for compressing the prior and likelihood respectively to the 20
dimensional space.
In figure 5.1, the likelihood input and prior input are nodes that provide the
named 20 dimensional inputs to the neural populations likelihood and prior respec-
tively. Both likelihood and prior populations are 20 dimensional and contain 200 LIF
neurons each. The product network receives input from these populations and computes
the posterior distribution (in the 20 dimensional space). It does so by computing an
element-wise product of its inputs as explained in section 5.2.1. The product network
contains 40 neural ensembles of 100 neurons each for a total of 4,000 neurons.
The output connection from product network to normalized posterior reconstructs
the posterior back to 120 dimensional space and computes the normalization function us-
ing principle 2 of the NEF. The posterior is reconstructed using the basis φ20(υ)
posterior
that is computed by taking the element-wise product of φ20(υ)
prior and φ20(υ)
liklihood. The
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reconstructed normalized posterior distribution is represented by normalized posterior
population that is 120 dimensional and contains 800 LIF neurons. Next I compute the
median of this distribution on the connection between the normalized posterior pop-
ulation and the prediction node (using principle 2 of the NEF). I read out the model
prediction from the prediction node.
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5.3 Results
5.3.1 Connecting the two models
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Figure 5.3: A schematic diagram of the complete neural model for learning priors and
inferring from them. The circles represent neural populations. The rectangles group the
neural populations into subnetworks. The rounded boxes represent nodes (non-neural).
The flow of information is denoted with arrows (→).Transformations are labelled along
these connections. The number of neurons and dimensions represented by each popula-
tion/network are labelled as N and D respectively. The blue labels indicate the quantity
encoded by the spike trains propagating through the connections.
In this section, I first show how the model presented in this chapter connects to the one
presented in the previous chapter. Figure 5.3 shows the schematic diagram of the complete
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neural model. The sensory node in the model for learning priors (figure 4.5) has been
replaced by the inference model (figure 5.1). As mentioned before in sections 4.3 and
4.4.1, this model can be used to learn the priors for any task in which the upper limit of
a duration, extent or any other numerical quantity needs to be predicted, given a sample
drawn from that interval. As the prior for a particular task is being learned, it can also be
used simultaneously to make predictions.
I use this model to obtain results for the life span inference task. In the model in figure
5.3, the sensory input provides an observed current age xi that is used by the likelihood
input node to compute the likelihood function based on equation 4.19. This 120 dimen-
sional distribution is then compressed to the 20 dimensional space on the connection to
likelihood population, which represents the likelihood in the compressed space.
The model begins with a random initial guess at the hyperparameters α(t) of the prior,
i.e., a randomly chosen prior from the prior space (section 4.4.1) is provided as input.
Similar to the likelihood, the initial prior is also compressed to the 20 dimensional space and
represented by prior population. The model then computes the normalized posterior as
explained before in section 5.2.2, which is represented by the norm. posterior population.
Recall that I earlier referred to the normalized posterior as T (xi, zi) (equation 4.13). Thus
the output of the norm. posterior population is reconstructed and multiplied by ml
through a node (not shown in the figure) to give T (xi, zi) ∗ ml. This was the output
from the sensory node in figure 4.5. The rest of the model works as explained in section
4.4.4, to learn the prior iteratively. Subsequent to the initial input, the input to the prior
population comes from cortical2, which represents the current optimal prior p(zi|α(t)) in
the 20 dimensional space.
The other output of norm. posterior is used to get the prediction out of the model as
explained in section 5.2.2. The prediction is based on the current age xi and it is possible to
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look at the predictions given different values of xi while the optimal prior is being learned.
As the learning proceeds, the accuracy of predictions improves over time. Once the optimal
prior has been learned and stabilized, we can provide the desired current age xi as input
to the model and read out the predicted life span from the prediction node. This is how
I obtain the results presented in the next section.
5.3.2 Comparison to human behavioral data
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Figure 5.4: Inference results from the neural model (95% confidence intervals), compared
to humans and Direct mode - our model with computations in low-dimensional (20 dimen-
sional basis) space, but without neurons.
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Figure 5.5: Inference results from Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) model (only data cor-
responding to human data), Computational model i.e., our replication of their model, and
Direct mode i.e., our model with computations in low-dimensional space, but without neu-
rons. The plot shows that there is no error caused due to the low dimensional embedding.
Recall from section 4.3, that each xi corresponds to the current/observed age t of an
individual, and each zi corresponds to the unknown life span ttotal of the same individual.
Figure 5.4 shows the inference results obtained from the neural model. Model predic-
tions are plotted for current ages t from 1 to 100. Human predictions are plotted for five
data points. They were obtained from figure 4.1B using a web plot digitizer. Neural model
predictions along with the predictions in direct mode are also plotted. In direct mode,
the model doesn’t simulate neurons, and all the computations in the model are performed
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mathematically. However, the dimensionality reduction is still carried out and the com-
putations are performed using the low dimensional (20 dimensional) distributions. The
difference between the results in Direct mode and Neuron mode is due to the limited num-
ber of neurons in the normalized posterior population. As the number of neurons in
this ensemble increases, the results approach the Direct mode results (800 neurons provide
the best fit to human data). Thus, neural results match the human data better due to the
approximate representation of the normalized posterior by the neurons in the normalized
posterior ensemble.
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Figure 5.6: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test results. Dissimilarity relative to human pre-
dictions - Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) model: 9.628, neural model: 1.959. Neural
model and human data are median predictions.
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Since the model performs computations using low-dimensional distributions, it is pos-
sible that the compression to a low-dimensional space may introduce some error in the
predictions, thus causing them to deviate from the optimal Bayesian predictions. To ver-
ify this, predictions from the Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) model, the computational
model (our replication of their model), and direct mode (our model with computations in
a compressed 20 dimensional space, but without neurons) were compared. The results of
this comparison are shown in Figure 5.5. Since the results obtained from the direct mode
are the same as the computational model, the low-dimensional embedding is not losing any
information and thus does not introduce any error. However, I expect some error due to
this constraint for more complex distributions.
I use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test to examine the goodness of fit of the neural
model predictions relative to the Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) model. The data used
for the K-S test is shown in Figure 5.6. The dissimilarity of the Griffiths and Tenenbaum
(2006) model relative to human predictions is 9.628, while that of the neural model is
1.959, indicating the much closer fit of the neural model to the human data.
Overall, my results suggest that the closer fit of the neural data can be solely attributed
to fitting the neuron tuning curves in the norm. posterior population, where 800 neurons
provide the best match to human performance. Since the low-dimensional neural imple-
mentation can be made to match the human data, this is some evidence in support of
the hypothesis that human brains represent low-dimensional state spaces (low-dimensional
parameterizations of high-dimensional distributions fit using neural tuning curves).
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5.4 Summary
In this chapter, I proposed neural mechanisms for performing Bayesian inference. First a
neural model was presented that combines neural representations of learned priors with the
neural representations of the likelihood (computed based on new observations) to perform
Bayesian inference in a low-dimensional space. It computes a posterior distribution using
a product network that performs an element-wise multiplication of its two inputs (prior
and likelihood). The posterior is then reconstructed back to a high-dimensional space and
its median is computed to get the prediction from the model.
Next, this model was connected to the model presented in chapter 4, such that it can
be used in the process of learning priors and also enable the learned priors to be directly
used for making predictions. The complete model was trained on a life span prediction
task and the predictions based on the prior learned by the model were compared to: (1)
human predictions, (2) the computational Bayesian model from (Griffiths and Tenenbaum,
2006), and (3) the non-neural version of my model, i.e., the direct mode that doesn’t
simulate neurons but still uses the low dimensional embedding of the distributions. The
results showed: (1) a close match between the predictions from the neural model and those
from humans, (2) a better fit of the neural model to human predictions relative to the
computational Bayesian model, and (3) no error caused by the process of dimensionality
reduction in the neural model.
Since the results from the neural model match human predictions, this provides some
evidence in support of the neural mechanisms proposed both for learning and inference, and
the hypothesis that human brains may represent functions embedded in a low-dimensional
space. However, more experiments need to be conducted in order to further validate/refute
the model. Furthermore, there are certain things in the model that can be improved to
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make it more computationally efficient, and provide room for future work. In the next
chapter, I discuss some key aspects of the model that haven’t been discussed in detail yet,
and provides avenues for future work.
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Chapter 6
Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter, I focus on discussing some topics related to the neural model presented in
the previous chapter. The discussion includes some of the limitations of the neural model,
and suggests avenues for future work both in experimental and theoretical domains. Some
of the sections also clarify the claims being made in this thesis. This is followed by the
final section that concludes this thesis by revisiting the goals I started with in section 1.2.
6.1 Testing the neural model
As we saw in section 5.3, one way of testing the model is to evaluate its performance
relative to behavioral data. In section 5.3, I show that it is possible to run both the
prior optimization and inference at the same time, and both become progressively more
accurate over time. I then show that the model predictions based on learned priors provide
a close match to the human behavioral data. The data was obtained from the behavioral
experiment conducted by Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) (refer to section 4.2.1). The
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subjects in the experiment were undergraduate students, i.e., people between ages of 18 to
23. This implies that their predictions were based on the learned optimal priors, since by
this age people have presumably already learned the distribution over the total life spans.
They know that the average life span is around 75 years (variable based on geographical
location) and that a 100 year old person is more likely to die sooner than a 40 year old.
Though the available behavioral data provides evidence in support of the mechanisms
used in the neural model, additional behavioral data might be useful to validate the learning
procedure used. For instance, longitudinal studies over the development period of children
can help provide data that may reflect how the predictions of children change over the
course of learning. For instance, children can be asked to perform the life span inference
task repeatedly at different stages of their life with a gap of several months to an year.
Their predictions can be used to compare the predictions of the model during the learning
phase, and provide evidence to further support or refute the neural mechanisms for learning
priors proposed in section 4.4.4. Furthermore, children may develop biases depending on
the environment they grow up in. For instance, average life expectancy in India is 68 years
while that in Canada is 82 years. Hence, children in these countries are likely to have
different priors over the total life spans. Thus, collecting behavioral data from longitudinal
studies across different populations and then comparing it to the predictions of the model
when trained on similar data can be a useful approach towards testing the model, as well
as testing and refining the hypothesized prior space used in the model.
6.2 Brain areas
Though behavioral data can be used to validate models on the computational and even
algorithmic levels, it doesn’t tell us much about the implementation level. Which areas
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of the brain may be involved in learning and inference tasks like the ones we are talking
about? What is the connectivity map among these areas? Which neural populations in
these brain regions should we record from to compare the activity of the neural populations
from our model? These are challenging questions given our limited understanding of the
brain.
It is well-known that prefrontal and frontal cortices are the most likely regions of
the brain involved in any kind of high level reasoning and inference (Donoso et al. 2014,
Christoff et al. 2001). However, the brain is a complex machine, and often makes use of
multiple regions to accomplish a specific task. Hence, the implementation level questions
are much harder to answer and require experimental data from fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging) and electrophysiology studies. Specifically, fMRI studies have been
found to be very useful in determining the functional neuroanatomy. Behavioral studies de-
scribed in the previous section could be conducted in an MRI machine in order to determine
the brain regions involved in the inference task. Furthermore non-invasive electrophysi-
ology techniques like EEG (electroencephalogram) and MEG (magnetoencephalography)
can also be used for mapping brain activity during behavioral studies. Such techniques
can inform our understanding of how the learning and inference might be happening at
the implementation level in the brain, and form a useful area for future work.
6.3 Encoding of the prior space
The proposed network architecture assumes a set of priors that are already stored in
the weights of the network. In the model in figure 5.3, the prior space is stored in the
weights of two connections: (i) log(p(zi|A)) on the connection between the norm. posterior
and cortical1, and (ii) p(zi|A) on the connection between WTA network output and
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cortical2. These stored priors can be potentially encoded in a more efficient manner.
For instance, instead of storing the full 120 × M dimensional prior space matrix, the
distributions in the prior space can also be compressed similar to other distributions that
were compressed and represented in the neural populations. The same basis space φ20(υ)
(as computed for cortical2 in section 4.4.4) can be used for projecting the prior space to
a 20 dimensional space. This would reduce the weight matrix size to 20 ×M . However,
this would also imply that the reconstruction of the normalized posterior back to 120
dimensional space wouldn’t be required at the connection between the norm. posterior
population and the WTA network. This reduces the dimensionality of norm. posterior
from 120 to 20 thereby reducing the number of neurons. This hasn’t been tested yet, and
is an important area for future work.
Additionally, as mentioned in section 4.4.5, an increase in the prior space size M is
another factor that contributes to an increase in the number of neurons in the model. The
methods of dimensionality reduction can also be applied to the prior space size, however
this is a tougher problem to solve. Recall that the prior space size M refers to the number
of distributions assumed to be in the prior space. One way to reduce this number is to
pick a set of distributions that can be used as a basis set to generate all the distributions
in the prior space through their linear combination. For instance, a set of skewed Gaussian
distributions could be used such that their linear combinations lead to a variety of different
distributions. However there are a few challenges that come with this approach:
• Choosing a set of basis functions to generate all the distributions in the prior space
can be a challenge, especially since different distributions in the prior space belong
to different families.
• Assuming that we are able to compress M down to K (where K << M) basis
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functions, it is not clear how the competition between the K functions at the WTA
stage of the network could be interpreted in terms of the original M distributions.
Though it is a challenge to compress M , if accomplished it would not only further
reduce the size of the weight matrices encoding prior space from M × 20 to K × 20, but
will also lead to a reduction in the number of neurons required for cortical1 and the
memory network, similar to cortical2. Therefore, this also forms an important area to
be researched in the future.
6.4 Scalability to other inference tasks
The neural model presented in this thesis can be used for learning priors and making
inferences for any task where the upper limit of any quantity needs to be determined given
a sample from that interval. However, the model rests on the following assumptions:
1. Likelihood assumption: The training data is generated using a hierarchical Bayesian
network (section 4.4.2) that is based on the assumption that there is an equal prob-
ability of observing any sample from the given interval i.e., xi|zi ∼ U [0, zi) and the
likelihood function used in the neural model for such inference tasks is given by the
equation 4.19.
2. Prior space assumption: The model assumes a prior space (section 4.4.4) based on
psychological data from Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006).
Therefore, the model can only scale to the tasks that follow assumption 1 and have
priors of the form assumed in 2. However, assumption 2 can be removed or at least relaxed
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if a suitable basis set of a small size K is used, such that any required prior distribution
can be constructed through the linear combination of these K distributions as suggested
in section 6.3.
The likelihood assumption is relevant at three places:
• In the hierarchical Bayesian network used for generating the training data. This
network is not a part of the neural model, and hence can easily be changed to adapt
to any task at hand. In other words, the neural model is agnostic to how the data
used to train it is generated. For instance, we could even use the data recorded from
the real world to train the model.
• In the likelihood input node shown in figure 5.3. Here the likelihood is computed
based on the current observation xi. However, since this is a node, the likelihood
is computed mathematically and compressed to a low dimensional (20 dimensional)
space, before it is sent to the likelihood population. The likelihood input node
can be programmed to compute any likelihood function irrespective of its form.
• In the weight matrix on the connection between norm. posterior and cortical1 in
figure 5.3. The weights on this connection are independent of the likelihood since
the likelihood is usually a function of zi as is the case in equation 4.19. As explained
in section 4.4.4: equation 4.20, the dot product of the likelihood with the posterior
gives a scalar value that doesn’t affect the relative values corresponding to the M
competing priors.
Based on the above points, only the computation in the likelihood input node is
affected by the likelihood assumption. However, note that the likelihood input node is
not really a part of the neural model, i.e., it computes the likelihood mathematically and
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I do not propose any neural mechanisms for doing so. Care must be taken to keep the
scalability of the model in mind, when considering neural mechanisms for the likelihood
computation. The rest of the neural model is scalable to the tasks having a likelihood
that’s either constant or expressed as a function of zi, which is usually the case.
6.5 Basis function computation
Recall that in sections 3.3 and 4.4.4, I propose that we can compute basis functions to
represent probability distributions in neural populations in an efficient way. Specifically,
the basis functions can be used to project high-dimensional distributions to low-dimensional
spaces, which require fewer neural resources for representation. These basis functions are
computed using Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). This is done mathematically, and I
do not make any claims about neural plausibility of the process of generating these basis
functions. It is worth noting that if all computations in the model are carried out in
the compressed space (as proposed in section 6.3), then we never need to know the basis
functions for model implementation, except when compressing the model inputs from high
to low-dimensional space.
Nevertheless, methods for doing dimensionality reduction in a neurally plausible way
have been proposed before. For instance, Tripp (2009) (chapter 8) showed that Hebbian
plasticity can change the dimension of the space coded by a neural population. Specifi-
cally, lateral connections within a neural population can modulate the dimension of the
neural code, since they directly influence the neurons’ tuning curves through their preferred
direction vectors. Tripp (2009) extended Oja’s original model (Oja, 1982) to show that
excitatory lateral connections in a neural population reduce the dimension of the neural
code, and inhibitory lateral connections increase the dimension. This is because the lateral
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interactions incline the tuning curves of neurons either towards (excitatory) or away (in-
hibitory) from those of other neurons laterally connected to it. Mutual excitation causes
the neurons to respond strongly to the same input. As a result, Hebbian plasticity draws
the (feedforward) weight vectors together thus inclining the tuning curves of neurons to-
wards each other. On the other hand, mutual inhibition prevents neurons from responding
strongly to the same input, as a result of which Hebbian plasticity draws the weight vectors
apart, inclining the tuning curves of neurons away from each other.
To summarize, lateral interactions can influence the dimension of the feedforward
weights and hence the dimension of the post-synaptic neural code. Hebbian plasticity in
combination with excitatory lateral connections in a neural population provide a possible
neural mechanism for dimensionality reduction, and can potentially be used for compress-
ing high-dimensional distributions to a lower-dimensional space in our model. However,
this hasn’t been implemented and tested yet, and needs further exploration.
6.6 Is the human brain really Bayesian?
I don’t claim that the human brain is Bayesian in the strictest sense. The performance of
our neural model doesn’t match the optimal Bayesian curve, but is closer to the human-
level performance. Recall from section 2.6 that one of the open questions in the field of
neurally plausible Bayesian computations is whether these computations are optimal. The
results from my model suggest that they are probably suboptimal when realized in the
brain due to the following reasons:
1. Limited resources: Figure 5.6 shows that the neural model provides a better match
to the human predictions than an ideal Bayesian model by Griffiths and Tenenbaum
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(2006). This is due to fitting of the neural tuning curves in the neural populations.
Given a large number of neurons, the neural model is able to replicate the ideal
Bayesian results. Thus, I predict that the suboptimal performance results from
limited neural resources in the brain.
2. Improperly learned beliefs: Second source of sub-optimality is the prior when used
during the learning phase. If the predictions are obtained from the neural model
using the incompletely learned priors, that introduces another source of error in the
predictions. In this case, the predictions won’t provide a good match to the human
behavioral data. However, as mentioned in section 6.1, developmental studies might
provide human data that can be fairly compared to the neural model predictions
during the learning phase.
3. Approximate computations: Third source of sub-optimality is the dimensionality
reduction of probability distributions for their efficient representation in neural pop-
ulations. Though figure 5.5 shows that the low-dimensional embedding doesn’t cause
any error in the life span inference task, I expect that it can be a source of error if
the distributions to be represented are more complex.
One can only claim that the brain is Bayesian if one believes that a “general-purpose
theory of cognition” exists. However, given that our brain is arguably the most complex
machine known to us as of today, and given our limited understanding of it, it is yet to be
determined whether the goal of finding such a general-purpose theory to explain the brain
even makes sense. Nonetheless, calling the brain Bayesian would require answering many
foundational questions: How well can Bayesian theories account for irrationality in human
cognition? Does the brain actually use Bayesian rules? Does it do so optimally or through
approximate descriptions? Do Bayesian theories require an implausibly uniform view of
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the mind? What kind of prior knowledge do we bring to bear on a particular learning or
inference task? How does that knowledge interact with the examples we observe to guide
our generalizations?
I haven’t attempted to answer all of these questions and do not intend to make the
claim that the brain is Bayesian. However, I believe that that certain computations in
the brain may be Bayesian (though probably not optimal), and I have shown their neural
plausibility by proposing neural mechanisms for them, and comparing the results to human
predictions.
In section 2.1, I mentioned that besides the Bayes’ theorem, the Bayesian Framework
has been expanded to include other methods for approximate inference that are out of
the scope of this thesis, e.g., variational Bayesian methods and Markov chain Monte Carlo
methods. Statisticians commonly use these approximate inference methods to deal with
very high dimensional problems, usually at a high computational cost. However, whether
these approximate methods are neurally plausible, and whether the human brain employs
them, are open questions. In this thesis, I do not make any claims about the neural
plausibility of these methods.
Furthermore, I do not claim that humans are rational. There is a large body of literature
on human decision making which suggests that humans do not make decisions according
to ‘rational’ rules and do not follow models based on the utility theory (Mongin, 1997).
For instance, the Ellsberg paradox (Segal, 1987) explains why most humans don’t take
risks and settle for the mediocre i.e., humans exhibit a strong aversion to ambiguity and
uncertainty, and have an inherent preference for the known over the unknown. In the face of
ambiguity in the probabilities of the outcomes, humans may formulate a vague probability
of possible outcomes which may be biased. For example, most humans avoid risk, and many
assume that if they are not told the probability of a certain event in a real-life scenario,
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it is to deceive them. This and other assumptions may affect their decisions, and hence
their decisions may not follow models based on classical probability. Thus, I suggest that
the probability distributions that humans represent may not always be accurate i.e., they
may be biased. However in this thesis, I have given a neurally plausible account of how
humans may represent probability distributions, regardless of whether these probabilities
are accurate or biased, and how these representations can be used in meaningful ways to
perform inference in a human-like way (which may not be optimal).
6.7 Conclusions
This thesis aimed to explore the neural plausibility of Bayesian inference. I proposed neural
mechanisms for two important components of Bayesian inference: (1) learning priors, i.e.,
forming/updating beliefs and (2) using the learned priors to perform Bayesian inference.
In chapter 3, I introduced the NEF, a framework that I used in this thesis to build spik-
ing neural models. The NEF constrains the kinds of computations we can use in our models
by forcing us to use the basic operations that the neurons can compute. Additionally, when
building neural models constrained by the implementation level details, one doesn’t get an
exact implementation of the algorithm that one may specify at the computational level.
Instead the neurons approximate that algorithm and the approximation depends on the
neural properties as well as the functions being computed. This is evident from chapter
4 where I showed how an algorithm at the computational level can be implemented at
the algorithmic level constrained by implementation level details. I used dimensionality
reduction for representing distributions in an efficient way, in order to comply with the
limited neural resources in the brain. Furthermore, in chapter 5, we saw from the results
that the model performance is sub-optimal, i.e., not Bayes’ optimal due to the approximate
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computations by neurons, but still matches the human predictions better than an optimal
Bayesian model. The low-level constraints also helped to define the architecture of the
neural models presented in both of these chapters. To summarize, I have illustrated the
importance of integrating different levels of analysis through the process of building the
models presented in this thesis.
In chapter 4, I presented a neural model for learning priors from life experience. The
assumptions underlying the model were stated and its performance was evaluated by com-
paring the learned prior to the true prior for a life span inference task. This learned prior
was then used in the complete neural model (figure 5.3) presented in chapter 5 to perform
Bayesian inference. Through the process of building these models, I showed (1) how prob-
ability distributions can be represented in neural circuits using an efficient coding scheme
(sections 3.3 and 4.4.4), and (2) how these neural representations can be used in meaningful
ways. For instance I showed how the neural representations of an initial prior are improved
over time by learning from new incoming observations (chapter 4). I also showed how the
neural representations of two different distributions can be combined using an element-
wise product to perform Bayesian inference (chapter 5). Finally, I reproduced behavioral
results for a life span inference task using the complete neural model that is able to learn
prior beliefs and use them for making predictions. The results from the neural model pro-
vided a good match to the behavioral data (section 4.4.5). This provides some evidence
in support of the hypothesis that human brains represent low-dimensional approximations
of high-dimensional distributions fit using neural tuning curves. It also indicates that the
computations in the human brain are sub-optimal as discussed in section 6.6, and provides
some evidence in support of the neural mechanisms proposed, though more experimental
work is needed to validate them as discussed in sections 6.1 and 6.2.
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